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ABSTRACT

This study describes special questions (SQs) and disjunctive questions (DQs) in English and Polish. Central to the study is the interrogative mood and the illocutionary force of the question: interrogative structures without illocutionary force are excluded. "Speech Act Theory" (SAT) is used as a label for certain tendencies in the approach to linguistic analysis, since questions are taken to be speech acts. Questions are defined syntactically, semantically, pragmatically, in terms of illocutionary force, and according to felicity conditions that govern appropriateness in so-called erotetic situations. The description of SQs and DQs is focused on their semantic structure where equivalent relationships holding between English and Polish question types can be stated. Indirectly, it is also demonstrated that the type of analysis perused in this study can be successfully applied in contrastive studies. (Author/JB)

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QUESTIONS IN ENGLISH AND POLISH

SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS

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The book would never have seen the print without the emotional and intellectual encouragement of my wife Ela.

INTRODUCTION

In this work an attempt is made to investigate some interrogative constructions in English and Polish that are used in linguistic communcation with the force of Questions. Although the syntactic behaviour of interrogative constructions is well-known and the relevant literature is abundant the uses to which they can be put in linguistic communication have not received much attention. The situation is very much the same in the field of language teaching: we know what the learner should do in order to turn, for example, a declarative sentence into an interrogative one but when it comes to the explication of the use of interrogatives we are at a loss.[1] On the other hand, it is a matter of common knowledge among language teachers that language instruction can not, and should not, be limited to teaching manipulative skills. In other words, we are no longer happy to know what characterizes interrogative, declarative, imperative, etc., sentences. We want to know how to express verbally a request for information, how to give an order or to make a statement, etc.

As linguists, we also want to be able to describe the type of knowledge the speaker of a language has when he interacts with other speakers verbally. We mean here the type of knowledge that allows him to make judgements about the communicative functions a particular utterance has in the context in which it is used. Needless to say, both traditional grammars and structural grammars, as well as generative-transformational grammars pay very little attention, if any at all, to the communicative aspect of language.

Fortunately, help came from the philosophical circles. Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) laid the foundation of what is now known as the Speech Act Theory (SAT). In the following pages we shall dwell on SAT and especially on the possibility of the application of SAT in Contrastive Analysis (CA).

In the present work we shall attempt a contrastive analysis of Direct Questions in English and Polish within a framework of SAT that will be proposed later. The choice of Direct Questions as the subject of this study can be justified as follows:

First, Questions have received relatively little attention in both English and Polish linguistic literature.

Second, most existing literature on Questions deals with their syntax rather than semantics. It is hoped that a contrastive analysis of the semantics of Questions should, eventually, lead to a refinement of statements concerning English and Polish Questions.

Third, the study of Questions is a particularly interesting area in an analysis of linguistic communication because communicative situations in which Questions occur involve an interaction between the participants in a more systematic and formalized manner than is the case with other forms of speech. The study of Questions can thus throw some light upon linguistic communication in general.

In our study Questions will be shown to be linguistic acts whose syntactic form is that of interrogatives. The communicative function of Questions is to obtain information about facts unknown to the speaker: Questions in this sense are sometimes called requests for information. To put it differently, we shall study one of many uses of interrogatives (Cf., Sadock 1974). We have decided to exclude other types of Questions from our analysis, e.g. Echo-Questions, Rehetorical Questions, on the grounds that they are not Questions in the sense applied in this study. For one thing, they are not used to elicit information about the outside world in the same sense as requests for information do. The present study of Questions is limited to semantic and communicative considerations. For this reason Intonation-Questions have also been excluded as being outside the scope of the analysis.

It has been widely recognized that SAT can provide valuable insights pertinent to understanding the mechanisms governing uses or communicative functions utterances can have in linguistic communication. Therefore, it is not surprising that linguistic research carried out within the framework of SAT is continually growing. Verschueren (1976), for instance, enumerates about eight hundred works dealing with or related to SAT; most of them were written in the 1970's. Yet, as the author acknowledges himself,

" ... the nature of the enterprise implies that we cannot make any claim of completeness". (Verschueren 1976:1).

We shall have more to say about SAT in the next section. Now we intend to dwell a bit on the possibility of the application of SAT to contrastive analyses. In the past decade various theoretical frameowrks have been used in comparing languages. Thus, there exist contrastive analyses in the traditional framework, structural framework, stratificational framework, and transformational framework. An evaluation of the applicability of these theoretical frameworks to CA can be found in numerous works, e.g. Di Pietro (1968), Moulton (1968), Dingwall (1964), Krzeszowski (1974), Lipinska (1975, 1977), Szwedek (1975). It is impossible and unnecessary to deal here with the complexity of problems, both theoretical and practical involved in CA. It suffices to say that CA has been oriented towards contrasting phonological, syntactic and semantic systems or subsystems of L_1 and L_2, and L_3 ... etc., for that matter. As pointed out earlier, the phonological considerations are left completely untouched in this study. Assuming that a more complete picture can be drawn if besides syntactic and semantic considerations the use of language in communicative situations is taken account of in linguistic description, we shall propose that CA must also include the latter. As a shorthand device we shall refer to the study of language use as the domain of Linguistic Pragmatics. It follows then, that CA can be subdivided into three basic types: Syntactic CA (SyCA), Semantic CA (SeCA), and Pragmatic CA (PrCA).[2] The type of relationship that holds among SyCA, SeCA, and PrCA is that of inclusion and not of exclusion. Inherent in this approach is the assumption that language can be studied on three levels: the syntactic, the semantic, and the pragmatic.

SyCA has been concerned with contrasting words, phrases, and sentences via a comparison of forms in L_I with their counterparts in L_2 or via a comparison of rules which account for the derivation of these forms in L_I and L_2. SeCA has been concerned with contrasting semantic structures underlying sentences belonging to L_I and L_2. Those

semantic structures have been conceived of as inputs to grammars G_I and G_2 (Cf. Krzeszowski 1974). It is difficult to say what PrCA should be concerned with because the scope of pragmatic analysis and its place in a total analysis of language have not been precisely defined yet. It seems, however, that PrCA should, at least, deal with a comparison of communicative functions which characterize equivalent structures across languages under analysis. Seen from another angle, PrCA should deal with the distribution of structures used across languages to fulfill the same communicative function. PrCA is, then, expected to answer the following questions: Do the speakers of language L_I express, say, a request in the same variety of ways as do the speakers of language L_2? Equally important, PrCA should be concerned with the degree of similarity/difference in the socio-cultural content of speech acts across languages. Thus, PrCA should be concerned with the matching of a form "a_1" with its communicative functions, F_I, F_2, F_3,... etc., across languages.

We shall devote more attention to consideration of the scope of PrCA later in this study. It is enough to say at this point that PrCA should be seen as an extension of SyCA and SeCA.



Fig. I.

The importance of the study of communicative functions of utterances has long been recognized. It will not be inappropriate to quote here just one opinion: "... we will no longer be satisfied merely with trying to describe the structure of language. What we want to know is how people use language to communicate." (Ingve 1969:458).[3]

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1. In fact, the syntactic and semantic behaviour of Questions has been extensively studied by logicians. Of particular interest here is the research of Belnap and Karttunen, among others. It is worthwhile pointing out that the present study was completed in the early spring of 1977 and recent works (Belnap and Steel 1976, Karttunen 1977) were not accessible to the author. Besides, the present study is traditional in that little attention is paid to the formalization of description.

2. Most linguistic analyses have been performed either within the framework of SyCA or SeCA. These, in turn, can be traditionally, structurally or transformationally oriented.

3. Very much the same can be found in Hass (1970) who writes the following: "But an equally important aspect is the communicative role the utterance of the sentence plays ..." (Hass 1970:287).

CHAPTER 1

AN OUTLINE OF THE SPEECH ACT THEORY

1. SPEECH ACTS: A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH

According to Rosenberg and Travis (1971) the publication of Strawson's "On Referring" marks the beginning of the philosophical study of speech acts.[1]

Strawson distinguished among sentences or expressions, the use of sentences or expressions, and the utterance of a sentence or an expression. Another important fact pointed out by Strawson was that we, the speakers, DO certain things when we utter a sentence or an expression. But it is the philosopher J. L. Austin who is considered to have initiated a systematic study of the use of utterances.

Austin's research on utterances led him to the postulation of two categories of utterances: constative utterances and performative utterances (Austin 1962). The former can be true or false and the latter, instead of truth values, can be characterized by various conditions pertaining to appropriateness of use. Austin called these conditions "felicity conditions" or "happines conditions"; a performative utterance can be "felicious" or "happy", or it can be "infelicitous" or "unhappy".[2] Austin's treatment of utterances is shown below:



On the basis of the distinction between Constatives and Performatives Austin had formulated a more general distinction between performative utterances and illocutionary acts, which he then replaced by the theory of illocutions.[3] Performative utterances fall into two groups:

A. Explicit performatives

B. Implicit performatives

The former are the ones whose main clauses are expressions such as "I promise", "I bet", "I request", etc. These expressions are overtly represented in the utterance and can be characterized as having the following features?

a. first person subject "I"

b. second person object (direct or indirect) "You"

c. the present tense and the indicative mood

d. one of the verbs belonging to the class of "performative verbs" as their main verb.

The latter do not have the above mentioned expressions present overly in the utterance but under certain circumstances can be equal to the former functionally. Accordingly, both (I) and (2) can express a request though in the case of (I) the request interpretation has an overt representation.

(I) I request you to pass me the salt.

(2) Pass me the salt.

A very important contribution of Austin's was his research on linguistic acts. He repeatedly stressed that when we say something we perform an act and we can do it in a variety of ways and functions. Thus, he distinguished three types of acts, linguistic acts to be precise, that the speakers perform in saying something.

A. Locutionary acts.

B. Illocutionary acts

C. Perlocutionary acts.

The Locutionary Act is anlayzed into:

A_1. phonetic act - the act of uttering certain noises

A_2. phatic act - the act of uttering certain words

A_3. rhetic act - the act of using words with some sense.

It is important to bear in mind that Illocutionary Acts are not merely senterces uttered by the speaker with some sense and references. They are used by the speaker with a certain intention to express some definite function, or force. Austin referred to this force as an "Illocutionary Force". In this sense, (1) and (2) above can be characterized as having the illocutionary force of a request.

Finally, Austin distinguishes Perlocutionary Acts, i.e., acts such as convincing, persuading, etc. Perlocutionary Acts are used in communication to affect the addressee. One must admit that the last category of linguistic acts, the perlocutionary act, did not receive much attention in Austin's writings and its definition is far from being clear. The same can be said about the research following Austin's.

To sum up, Austin's classification of linguistic acts can be illustrated as follows:

Act A or Locution

He said to me: "You can't do that."

Act B or Illocution

He protested against my doing it.

Act C or Perlocution

He pulled me up, checked me.

(Austin 1962: 102).

Let us now turn to "Illocutionary Force". Briefly, illocutionary forces are names Austin gives to the different types of function language has in the performance of illocutionary acts. According to Austin, it is essential to distinguish force from meaning. This claim has been questioned in Cohen (1971). Cohen argues that the fact that some utterances command rather than advise, or recommend rather than request, is a feature of their respective meanings and not something that should be distinguished from their meanings under a label like illocutionary force. When we say, e.g., "I protest", we are not describing our protest, says Cohen, we are just protesting. Therefore,

whenever explicitely performative expressions are used the illocutionary force cannot be distinguished from the meaning. The type of meaning that is present in, e.g., "I protest" is called by Cohen a performative meaning. We are of the opinion that Cohen's conception of meaning faces serious difficulties. In the first place, Cohen's proposal does not account for an explanation of these cases where the performative expressions are missing from the actual utterance, i.e., it does not account for a unified treatment of explicit and implicit performative expressions, which Austin's theory does.

Secondly, such expressions as "I promise", "I request", etc., are used in describing the illocutionary force and they are theoretical constructs. Very often these expressions occur overtly in speech. However, it is a mistake, we think, to treat, e.g., "I promise you" in (3) on a par with "I promise you" in (4).

(3) (I promise you) I will come.

(4) I promise you to shoot you.

In (3) "I promise you" is used as a performative sentence accounting for the illocutionary force of "I will come". The illocutionary force in question is that of a promise. By definition (3) cannot have any other force but that of a promise (4), on the other hand, can, under favorable circumstances, be used with a force of a threat. "I promise you" in (3) is performative whereas it is not performative in (4) on the reading given above. It seems that Cohen's understanding of "performativeness" is somewhat different from Austin's.

Lastly, we think that the meaning of the speech act in the sense of Austin, i.e. sense and reference, can be found in the proposition. The performative expression merely assigns a function that a proposition fulfills in communication via an utterance. In the light of the above, Cohen's conception of meaning does not seem to hold.[4]

The problem of linguistic acts was taken up by Austin's pupil, Searle. He devoted much attention to the study of illocutionary acts. For Searle (1970) illocutionary acts are

intentional rule-governed speech acts.[5] The term Speech Act is crucial here. Searle (1970:16) gives the following definition of a speech act: "... the production or issuance of a sentence taken under certain conditions is a speech act, and speech acts are the basic or minimal units of linguistic communication." His classification of speech acts is, however, different from the one proposed by Austin. Below is presented Searle's classification of speech acts:

A. Utterance acts ..... uttering words.

B. Propositional acts ... referring and predicating.

C. Illocutionary acts ... stating, questioning.

It is easy to notice that Searle's classification of speech acts is considerably different from the one proposed by Austin. Firstly, Searle's "utterance acts" are Austin's "locutionary phatic acts" (A_2). Secondly, Searle's "propositional acts" are Austin's "locutionary rhetic acts" (A_3) plus predication. Thirdly, Searle does not mention Austin's "perlocutionary acts" (C). Both classifications recognize "illocutionary acts". Fig. 1 represents both classifications.[6]

Austin	Searle
1. Locutionary Act	4. Utterance Act
a. phonetic act	
b. phatic act	
c. rhetic act	5. Propositional Act
2. Illocutionary Act	6. Illocutionary Act
3. Perlocutionary Act	

Figure 1.

To finish the discussion on the treatment of speech acts by philosophers a mention must be made about Grice's research. He is less concerned with universal features of

speech acts and is more interested in principles of the "talk exchange", i.e., in principles of conversation. In his 1967 William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University he points out that it is essential to distinguish what is said from what is implied, or meant or suggested (Grice proposes the verb "implicated") in discourse. For the latter situation he uses the term implicature. Sometimes, says Grice, the conventional meaning of the expressions used can help to determine what is said. However, very often the conventional meaning of the expression cannot help to determine what is implicated. Therefore, what is implicated is often determined by means of non-conventional implicatures, i.e., Conversational Implicatures. Thus Conventional Implicatures are seen as general principles of conversation which the participants must observe. One such general principle is the Cooperative Principle which states the following (Grice 1975:45).[7]

> "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange..."

Grice's theory has two parts; one dealing with the "speaker's meaning" and the other one dealing with the setting up of maxims of conversation which explain the cooperative nature of communication.

Grice argues that there is a general convention which all speakers (and all hearers) observe: in communicating some proposition "p" the speaker is communicating his belief that "p" with the intention that the hearer, knowing that the speaker only says "X" if he believes that "p", will also believe that "p". This is, very briefly, how the theory accounts for the "speaker's meaning".

The second part of the theory explains not only how speakers use sentences of the language but also how they succeed in communicating information which is not specified by the meaning of the sentences in question. Following Kant, Grice distinguishes four categories: Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner under which fall more specific maxims and sub-maxims:

QUANTITY:

a. Make your contribution as informative as is required

b. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required

QUALITY: Try to make your contribution one that is true

a. Do not say what you believe to be false

b. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence

RELATION: Be relevant

MANNER: Be perspicuous

a. Avoid obscurity of expression

b. Avoid ambiguity

c. Be brief

d. Be orderly

And thus, the first category relates to the quantity of information, the second relates to the validity of what is being said, the third relates to the relevancy of what is being said, and the third category relates to the manner of speaking.

Grice's research on conversational implicature has had a great impact on many linguists, especially those interested in the semantic and communicative aspects of language. Before we pass to discussing linguistic approaches to the problems hinted above a summary of the main points raised so far is in order.

Austin seemed to be dealing with meaning as present in an utterance and expressed formally (or, rather, accounted for formally) by means of a performative sentence which accounts for the illocutionary force of the utterance. Searle was more concerned with the definition of a speech act seen as a minimal unit of linguistic communication and conditions under which the given speech act can be performed. Grice's work was centered around problems pertaining to general principles of conversational interaction and the implicated (non-literal) meaning. Another important aspect of Grice's research was his interest in "ordinary language" as used in "conversation" or, simply, "talk" and not in the language as used by an idealized speaker-hearer.

2. SPEECH ACTS: A LINGUISTIC APPROACH

It would be misleading, if not wrong, to hold that it is clear what is "philosophical" and what is "linguistic" in the study of speech acts. Speech acts are very complex objects and a full analysis of their structure and meaning, both propositional and illocutionary must involve, basically, three different types of analyses; a syntactic analysis, a semantic analysis, and a pragmatic analysis. It is not, then, surprising that both linguists and philosophers are equally interested in the analysis of speech acts. However, any attempt at drawing a line of demarcation between a "philosophical aspect" and a "linguistic aspect" of the study of speech acts can lead to an oversimplification. The difficulty is, perhaps, seen more clearly if we realize that speaking a language is not merely using rules of grammar of that language but it is also performing public actions (or behaving publically) which are not purely linguistic. Thus to answer the question "What is philosophical in linguistics?" is equally as difficult to answer as is the question, "What is linguistic in philosophy?" Rosenberg and Travis (1971:5) state the following in this connection: ..." it is far from clear which questions are genuinely about language, and which are not. Formally, most if not all questions in philosophy can be viewed as questions about language."

We shall be using two terms: "philosophical approach to SAT" and "linguistic approach to SAT" in a very specific and narrow sense. The former will refer to the approaches sketched in the previous section, i.e. Austin, Searle, and Grice, and the latter will refer to the approaches sketched in this section.

As it is impossible to report on all significant contributions to SAT within the philosophical approach it is equally impossible to give an account of all proposals concerning SAT that come from the linguistic circles. Therefore, our presentation of the linguistic approach to SAT will be limited to what we consider prevailing tendencies.

Before we pass to the discussion of the linguistic approach to SAT in the sense defined above we would like to sketch in a few words the linguistic background against

which problems pertaining to SAT can be seen. In the late 60's, when Searle's book on speech acts was already published and Grice's paper on conversational implicature, though still unpublished, was widely circulated in philosophical and linguistic quarters, the latter were involved in a heated discussion. At least some of them were, to be precise. A group of Chomsky's schismatic disciples, later known as generative semanticists, turned against their master. One of the controversial issues was the status of deep structure within the model proposed in Chomsky (1965). Generative semanticists proposed that a more abstract level, deeper than the one envisaged by Chomsky, could better account for the explanation of linguistic phenomena. Without going into a detailed discussion about the "abstractness" controversy, which is not our interest here, one can observe that the search for a more abstract level of linguistic representation brought about interest in the research of such people as Austin, Searle, and Grice.

Perhaps among the first linguists who tackled the problem of "abstractness" within a linguistic htoery of the generative-transformational type were G. Lakoff (1965) and R. Lakoff (1968). They proposed that a linguistic description should involve a class of verbs which they called "abstract verbs". Then, Ross (1970) proposed that declarative sentences, such as the one in 5 below, be derived from an abstract structure shown in Figure 2.

(5) Prices slumped



Figure 2

The structure shown in Figure 2.can easily be paraphrased, as is done in (6).

(6) I declare to you, "Prices slumped".

It is worth noticing that Ross introduced the feature (+performative) into the semantic matrix for the predicate verb of the higher sentence and by doing so he demonstrated how the concept of "performativeness" could be incorporated into a linguistic model. For the sake of accuracy, however, it must be noted that Katz and Postal (1964:76) alluded to a possibility of interpreting imperatives as being derived from underlying structures which contain an "imperative morpheme" having the meaning of, "the speaker requests (demands, insists, etc.)". But this was only an allusion. Ross also demonstrated how the underlying structures for declarative sentences were processed by the grammar until the surface forms were generated. His hypothesis, widely known as the Performative Analysis, made the following claims:

A. Every sentence has the following canonical form: Illocutionary Force Marker -

B. The Illocutionary Force Marker finds expression in the performative clause which uniquely specifies the illocutionary force of the sentence.

C. The Propostional Content Marker finds expression in the embedded, non-performative clause.

D. The performative clause is deleted under certain syntactically statable conditions by the Performative Deletion Transformation.

It is not difficult to see that Ross's hypothesis is a direct incorporation of Austin's concepts of performative utterances and illocutionary forces into the generative-transformational model of grammar. This hypothesis influenced many linguists and Ross can rightly be considered as the initiator of the linguistic studies on performative verbs. Very soon after the publication of Ross' paper there appeared papers expressing criticism directed against some of the claims made by Ross.[8] We shall discuss Fraser (1971) who wrote extensively on performative verbs. He observes the following in

connection with Ross' proposals:

1. Ross' claim that the performative verb be in the topmost clause of the underlying representation fails to be true because there exist sentences like those in (7) and (8) where the performative verb is embedded and is not the highest verb.[9] (7) I am pleased to be able to offer you the job. (8) I would like to congratulate you. (7) and (8) function as an offer and a congratulation, respectively, even though the performative verb is not in the highest clause.
2. The contention that a sentence has one and only one performative verb which specifies its force must be revised. Fraser (1971:4) gives the following sentence as a counterexample:

   (9) I announce that I hereby promise to be timely.

   (9), according to Fraser, is simultaneously an act of announcing and an act of promising: it is force ambiguous.
3. A similar case of force-ambiguity is demonstrated in (10).

   (10) Can you bring me my slippers?

   According to Fraser (1971: 6), (10) can count as having the forces; that of a question and that of a request. The former can be called a literal force of (10) and the latter can be called a derived (or conveyed) force of (10). Thus (10) denies the claim of a single performative verb per sentence.
4. Fraser (1971:9) gives arguments against the claim put forward by Ross to the effect that the rule of Performative Deletion Preserves both meaning and force. (11) and (12) are not synonymous as to the force. In the case of (11) the rule of Performative Deletion must be blocked, concludes Fraser.[10]

   (11) I even claim that John will win tomorrow.

   (12) Even John will win tomorrow.

In the conclusion of his paper Fraser states that the Performative Analysis proposed by Ross is not motivated syntactically but, he stresses, the question of pairing sentence

with their forces is an important one.[11] The linguistic approach to SAT in its initial stage was limited to providing syntactic motivation for the existence of performative verbs and the form of the performative clause. Despite all the criticism directed against Ross (1970) the number of linguists working within the framework of the Performative Analysis was constantly growing. It is fair to say that what used to be called the Performative Analysis in the late 1960's and early 1970's went in many directions; some of them had been anticipated by Ross in the section dealing with the possibility by Ross in the section dealing with the possibility of a pragmatic account for linguistic data.

We shall now present an inventory of problems which we think were significant in the development of the linguistic approach to SAT in the middle 1970's. The basic literature has been indicated.

I. Taxonomy of Performative Verbs - Fraser (1974, 1975).

Fraser revised Austin's classification of illocutionary acts and proposed that illocutionary acts be classified into eight types. Each type is characterized by a different position of the speaker towards the proposition expressed in the utterance. Then, Fraser classified a large group of vernacular performative verbs (about two hundred and eighty verbs) into these eight act-types.[12]

A. Acts of Asserting: The speaker's assessment of how the proposition expressed fits into the conversation, and the speaker's strength of conviction in the truth of the proposition expressed.

B. Acts of Evaluating: The speaker's assessment of the truth of the proposition expressed, and the basis for this judgement.

C. Acts of Reflecting Speaker Attitude: The speaker's assessment of the appropriateness of the state of affairs resulting from some prior act expressed by the proposition.

D. Acts of Stipulating: The speaker's desire for the acceptance of the naming

convention expressed by the proposition.

E. Acts of Requesting: The speaker's desire for the hearer to bring about the state of affairs expressed in the proposition.

F. Acts of Suggesting: The speaker's desire for the hearer to consider the merits of the action expressed in the proposition.

G. Acts of Exercising Authority: The speaker's proposal to create a new state of affairs by exercising certain rights or powers.

H. Acts of Committing: The speaker's proposal to place himself under an obligation to bring about the state of affairs expressed in the proposition.

II. Presupposition - Horn (1969), Morgan (1969), Morin and O'Malley (1969), Lakoff (1971), Hutchinson (1971), Katz (1972), Fillmore (1972), Cooper (1974), Kempson (1975), Stalnaker (1972).

The term Presupposition has been used to cover, basically, the concepts: logical presupposition and pragmatic presupposition.[13] The former is a relation holding between the logical structures. The latter is a relation holding between an individual and a proposition. In the pragmatic account of presuppositions it is not one sentence that presupposes another sentence but the participants of discourse who make assumptions about what is being said. In other words, presuppositon is a relation holding between either the speaker or the addressee and the content of the utterance. Accordingly, one can speak about speaker-based presuppositions and the addressee-based presuppositons. Cooper (1974) points out that presuppositon should be treated as an aspect of meaning. Then he argues that whenever a speaker utters a sentence without presupposing that speakers of that sentence normally presuppose he cannot be said to really mean what the sentence normally means. Thus, if someone utters (13) without presupposing (14) it can onlybe said that Harry regretted what he took to be killing of his grandma, and not that he regretted killing his grandma.

(13) Harry regretted that he killed his grandma.

(14) Harry killed his grandma.

Presuppositons have often been described as necessary conditions for the proper use of a sentence (e.g. Morin and O'Malley, 1969). According to this view, different sentences can be said to have different presuppositions associated with them. For example, one of the conditions securing a felicitous performance of an order is a belief on the part of the speaker issuing the order that the addressee is capable of executing it.

Hutchinson (1971) holds that presuppositons are best explained in terms of beliefs, on the part of the speaker, about the world and about the interlocuter. He proposes that presupposition be defined on the basis of inferences concerning the speaker's beliefs. And thus, Hutchinson (1971: 136) proposes the following Inference Schema to account for presuppositions the speaker has upon uttering a sentence with the force of an assertion.

Inference Schema: X says "A" to Y as an assertion
X believes that B and X believes that Y believes that B and X believes that A and X believes that Y is ignorant of A.

Where: X = speaker
Y = addressee
A = assertion
B = an extra-linguistic fact

Under this analysis presupposition involves a belief on the part of the speaker that the addressee is aware of some fact which the speaker believes to be true. Assertion, on the other hand, involves a belief on the part of the speaker that the addressee is ignorant of some facts which the speaker believes to be true.

It is hoped that the foregoing discussion on presupposition, though fragmentary, has shown that pragmatic presupposition is a propositional attitude (in the sense of Stalnaker, 1972) which plays a role in determining the content of communication.

It seems appropriate to close the discussion on presupposition by quoting Stalnaker (1972: 389):

> "The shared presuppositions of the participants in a linguistic situation are perhaps the most important constituent of a context. The concept of pragmatic presupposition should play a role, both in the definition of various speech acts such as assertion, prediction, or counterfactual statement, and also in specifying semantical rules relating sentences to propositions relative to contexts."

III. Conversational Implicature - Gordon and Lakoff (1971), Transderivational Rules Cole (1975), Sadock (1974), Derived Force Green (1975), Davison (1975), Ross (1975).

Grice introduced the notion of conversational implicature to account for cases in which what is being communicated, i.e. conversationally implied, cannot be derived from the logical structure of the sentence but can be related to principles of conversation. Gordon and Lakoff (1971) in an attempt to formalize some of the conversational principles and to incorporate them into the theory of generative semantics. Gordon and Lakoff's name for the conversational principles is "conversational postulates".

Conversational postulates are formulated in terms of ordinary logical structures. By incorporating conversational postulates into the theory of generative semantics it is possible, according to Gordon and Lakoff, to characterize entailment relations holding between a sentence and its meaning; both literal and conveyed. And thus, they propose two types of conversational postulates: Sincerity Conditions and Reasonableness Conditions. Both Sincerity Conditions and Reasonableness Conditions are principles governing the sincerity and the reasonableness of speech acts. Gordon and Lakoff demonstrate in their paper how these two sets of principles account for the sincerity and reasonableness of Requests. Accordingly, a request is reasonable under the following conditions:

1. A request is reasonable only if the speaker has a reason for wanting it done.
2. A request is reasonable only if the speaker has a reason for assuming that the hearer can do it.
3. A request is reasonable only if the speaker has a reason for assuming that the hearer would be willing to do it.

4. A request is reasonable only if the speaker has a reason for assuming that the hearer would not do it otherwise.

The conditions on the reasonableness of requests (1-4) are then stated in a formalized language. There is no need to repeat the formalism here.

As to the rules of grammar, Gordon and Lakoff postulate the incorporation of Transderivational Rules into grammars of natural languages. The aim of transderivational rules is to characterize what happens in one derivation on the basis of what is the case in one or more derivations. In other words, transderivational rules account for the relations among derivations.

Perhaps the most extensive treatment of the Performative Analysis that came from a linguist in that period was offered in Sadock (1974). Sadock claims that the logical structure of every sentence contains a performative clause (a Hyper-sentence) which accounts for the illocutionary (literal) meaning of that sentence. The problem is, stresses Sadock, how the grammar is to assign this or that performative clause to a sentence in all those cases where the illocutionary force of that sentence is not transparent and, therefore, the question can not be decided in a mechanical way. Sadock argues that the question of the force-assignment should be decided on the basis of syntactic arguments. One must say that Sadock, despite the title, pays more attention to a demonstration of how the Performative Analysis can be incorporated into a generative-semantics model of grammar, rather than to a proposal of a linguistic theory that can effectively and convincingly account for speech acts.

Let us now consider Cole (1975). He analyzes an example due to Gordon and Lakoff (1971:63). In this conversation a duke addresses his butler:

(15) Duke: It's cold in here.

(16) Butler: I'll close the window, sir.

It is clear from the above conversation that the butler has taken (15) to mean (17)

(17) Close the window.

However, argues Cole, it would be counterintuitive to claim that the logical structure of (15) is the same as the one underlying (17). The meaning of (17) is the result of an inerence, or deduction, from (15). Cole reconstructs what may have gone in the butler's mind on hearing (15).

> "The butler realizes that his occupational goal is to cater to his master's wants. Upon hearing and understanding the literal sense of (6) (our 15), the butler asks himself why the duke is telling him about the temperature. Dismissing as improbable that the duke is merely commenting on the end of summer, the butler concludes that the duke is uncomfortable and that he, the butler, had better correct this state of affairs. Thus he replies as in (7)"(our 16). Cole (1975:260).

It can be added that (15) can have two meanings depending on context: the Literal Meaning and the Inferred Meaning. According to Cole, the latter is dependent on the former and both are psychologically real levels of meaning.

Cole goes on by postulating three conditions that a rule of conversational implicature must fulfill:

1. What the sentence to which the rule applies is understood to mean is different from the literal meaning conveyed by the words making up the sentence.
2. There exists a plausible chain of inference from the putative literal meaning of the sentence to the conveyed meaning.
3. The application of the syntactic rule is consistent only with the conveyed meaning of the sentence and not with the putative literal sense of the sentence.

Then, Cole (1975:272) proposes that the relationship between syntax, logical structure, and conversational implicature be the following;

> "A rule of grammar (transformation, derivational constraint, level constraint, and so forth) may refer to stages in the derivation of a sentence from logical structure to surface structure. A rule of grammar, however, has no access to the conversational entailment of logical structure".

It is worth mentioning that what Cole calls Inferred Meaning has often been called Derived Meaning, or Indirect Meaning, or Conveyed Meaning. The same terminological plurality has been used in the literature to name the illocutionary force and the speech

act that an utterance of a sentence may be associated with in communication. This is shown below where A, B, and C stand for "meaning", "illocutionary force", and "speech act", respectively.

A : Meaning	B : Illocutionary Force	C : Speech Act
Direct - Indirect	Direct - Indirect	Direct - Indirect
Literal - Non-literal	Derived	
Conveyed		
Inferred		
Implied		

It must be emphasized that there seems to exist a growing interest in the sort of meaning (force, and speech act, as well) that is represented in the right-hand columns of A, B, and C, i.e., Indirect Meaning, Indirect Speech Act, etc.It is, therefore, essential to distinguish the traditional use of "indirect" from the one employed in the approaches outlined above. The former is synonymous with "embedded" or "reported" whereas the latter, when applied to SAT, has come to mean a speech act whose surface forms may be syntactically marked with, for example, inverted word order characteristic of questions, while its illocutionary force may be that of a request.

Indirect speech acts have been extensively treated in Searle (1975), Davison (1975), and Sadock (1974).

"Embedded" has assumed a different meaning in SAT and stands for "embedded performative", i.e., a performative verb which in the surface is embedded in a clause with a modal verb. This class of performative verbs has come to be known as Hedged Performatives due to Fraser (1975).

The above discussion on Conversational Implicature and related problems (Derived Force, Transderivational Rules) showed that more and more linguists were investigating means of encoding information about the intentions of the speaker and his assuptions about the world, the addressee, and the context in which speech took place.

SUMMARY

In the section entitled :Speech Acts:A Philosophcal Approach" we have reviewed four approaches which contributed to the development of SAT. The basic distinctions postulated in the so-called philosophcal approach to SAT have been the following:

1. Utterances have been distinguished from sentences.
2. A class of performative verbs has been postulated.
3. Illocutionary acts have been distinguished from other types of speech acts.
4. An account of speech acts in terms of illocutionary forces has been offered.
5. Conditions on the appriopriateness of use, i.e., felicity conditions have been proposed.
6. Ways to deal with principles of conversation have been proposed.

In the section entitled "Speech Acts:A Linguistic Approach" tendencies towards the analysis of speech acts by linguists have been skeyched. Two stages in the development of the linguistic approaches to SAT have been distinguished.

Stage 1. The period of the late 1960's and early 1970's witnessed a growing interest on the part of linguists, especially generative semanticists, in the research advanced by Austin, Searle, Strawson, and Grice. The Performative Analysis initiated by Ross stimulated research on performative verbs and the ways of representing them in the underlying structure of sentences.

Stage 2. Although research within the framework of the Performative Analysis still continued in the early 1970's the stress shifted from issues concerning performative sentences to problems concerning presupposition and its role in determining meaning. The publication of Gordon and Lakoff (1971) initiated linguistic research on conversational implicature. Since then a considerable amount of scholarly work in linguistics has been devoted to conveyed meaning and indirect speech acts. Another feature of this period has been a growing

tendency to provide syntactic motivation vis-a vis semantic and pragmatic for the postulation of rules accounting for the relationship between the illocutionary force of a sentence and its syntax.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1

Rosenberg and Travis have in mind Strawson (1950) reprinted in Rosenberg and Travis (1971). We shall be referring to Strawson (1950) as Strawson (1971a).

2

Searle (1971a:262) points out that certain performatives can have truth values and certain constatives can be felicitous or infelicitous.

3

In fact, Austin replaced his original distinction between constatives and performatives with a general theory of illocutions. For details cf., Searle (1971a) and Furberg (1963).

4

Cf., a remark made by Searle (1971a:264f5); "Cohen unfortunately seems to conclude that there are no such things as illocutionary forces. This conclusion seems unwarranted". Searle (1971b) can be consulted on a detailed analysis of promises. Cf., also Fillmore (1972:17) for a discussion of Searle's approach.

5

What we refer here as Searle (1970) is the third edition of the widely known Searle (1969)

6

Fig. 1. is a modified version of Verschueren (1976:68).

7

Grice (1975) is based on Grice's William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1967.

8

Cf., Anderson (1971) and Kac (1972). Staal (1970:373) proposes that declaratives be derived from the structure as the one below:



However, Fraser (1971:31) expresses a view that a verb of saying could be postulated over the performative verb. This, needless to say, runs counter to the claim made by Ross.

9

Lee (1975) discusses cases where the performative clause is embedded in a modal construction. In such case the central force of the utterance is expressed by the embedded performative and the modal auxiliary, e.g.,"may",simply functions as a sign of deferance: "May I suggest that you run for the presidency this time?"

10

Cf., also Horn (1969) on more details concerning "only" and "even" in English.

11 Numerous linguists have contributed evidence in support of the Performative Analysis: cf., Peterson (1969), Lee and Maxwell (1970), Davison (1970), Postal (1972), Schreiber (1972), Lakoff (1969). Sadock (1974) contains a lengthy chapter on the Performative Analysis.The question of pairing a sentence with its illocutionary forces has been elaborated in Fraser (1973).

12 Developing Strawson's (1971b) distinction between conventional and non-conventional acts Fraser (1974b) introduced a distinction between two types of illocutionary acts: "ceremonial acts" (e.g., christening, doubling at bridge) which require some institutionalized situation for their performance and "vernacular acts" (e.g., asking a question,promising).

13 Cf., Cooper (1974) and Kempson (1975) for an extensive treatment of presupposition in logic, philosophy, and linguistics. Logical presupposition will not be discussed here but cf., Keenan (1971).

CHAPTER 2

QUESTIONS: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH

1. INTERROGATION VERSUS QUESTION

In the previous chapter we have reviewed what we consider to be basic questions pertaining to the analysis of speech acts (SA). The range of problems tackled by the scholars working in the framework of SAT has appeared to be very wide due to developments in philosophy and linguistic pragmatics. One of the achievements of that period, which we may call the Post-Austinian Era (the term is borrowed from Binnick 1971), has been the realization that not all declarative sentences assert and that not all interrogative sentences question. There is nothing new in this contention but it must be emphasized with considerable strength that never before has this contention taken the form of a systematic study within a linguistic theory. The shift of stress from sentences to utterances has brought about a growing interest in the functions utterances can have in linguistic communication. This, in turn, has resulted, among other things, in a terminological chaos, a situation quite common whenever "the old" and "the new" co-exist for some time. One of the terms that has been notoriously abused is the term Question; especially when contrasted with another term - Interrogation. In this section of Chapter 2 we shall dwell on these two terms.

It must be stated at the outset that the term Question has been used quite freely. Very often it has been equated with Interrogation. In Bolinger (1957), for example, all chapters have "question" in their headings, despite the title, and the very term "question" is defined in terms of "interrogative ingredients" such as:

a. Interrogative distribution

b. Interrogative syntax

c. Interrogative intonation

d. Interrogative gesture

More recent treatments implicitly make a distinction between the two terms. According to Quirk et al (1972: 386) interrogative stands for one of the four types of clauses:

1. Declarative
2. Interrogative
3. Imperative
4. Exclamatory

In this treatment only Question has the status of a sentence. The four members of this category are shown below:

a. Statement
b. Question
c. Command
d. Exclamation

Interestingly enough, Quirk et al (1972) define Question from the point of view of its syntax using similar criteria to these used by Bolinger (1957), and from the point of view of their communicative functions. And thus, questions are used "...to express lack of information on a specific point, and... to request the listener to supply this information verbally" (Quirk et al 1972: 386).

A drastically opposite view is expressed by Hutchinson (1971: 138) who maintains that "... a question is a linguistic form that may be used to interrogate..." His definition of interrogation, in turn, is as follows:

> X says "A" to Y as an interrogation
> X believes that B and X believes that
> Y believes that B and X is ignorant
> of A' and X believes that Y is not
> ignorant of A'

It is clear from the above that both Quirk et al (1972) and Hutchinson (1971) use the same definiens. However, the former for Question and the latter for Interrogation.

Chafe (1970), on the other hand, holds that questions are requests of a special kind and he attributes the feature of "requestness" to interrogation.

The above examples will suffice to show that the problem of distinguishing Question from Interrogation is by no means uniformely treated by grammarians[1].

An exception in this respect is Huddleston (1971) who consistently distinguishes between the Grammatical Mood of a sentence and its Illocutionary Force (IF). In his approach the term Interrogative is used for one type of sentence according to its grammatical mood, whereas Question refers to the illocutionary force of a specific speech act.

Following Huddleston we shall keep the two terms apart. The main reason for this approach, besides the arguments given by Huddleston, stems from the belief that the grammatical mood of a sentence should not be mixed up with the communicative function the given sentence can perform in linguistic communication. Accordingly, Interrogative will mean for us a syntactic property of sentences. It can have various realizations in the languages of the world. Under certain circumstances interrogative sentences can function in linguistic communication as Questions. This feature of interrogative sentences has been pointed out by Polański (1967: 101) for whom interrogative sentences (Zdania pytajne) are generated from underlying structures of the following form:[2]

$$M_{int} \frown S$$

where M_{int} = modal characterization of an interrogative sentence

$\frown$ = symbol of concatanation

S = Sentence without a modal characterisation

Question, on the other hand, is a name for the communicative property of utterances and is characterized by having the same function in many languages. The function of Questions in linguistic communication is to obtain some missing information. Gordon and Lakoff's (1971) name for this function of Questions is "requests for information". Question thus conceived is a speech act (SA). It is worth stressing that the syntactic form of a question as a SA is not limited to interrogative sentences though interrogative sentences very often are used, more than any other type of sencences, with the force of questions. Question is thus a Speech Act (SA) whose communicative function is that of a request for information. It is essential to distinguish between Illocutionary Force (IF) of a speech act and its syntactic form. SA, as a communicative category, is uniquely associated with some IF relative to a context appropriate for the given SA. And thus, Question in the sense given above is always associated with IF such that it conveys a request for information, IF_Q in short. The correspondence holding between a SA and its IF must, therefore, be one-to-one. On the other hand, a syntactic

form, to be more precise a sentence type, is not uniquely associated with one and the same IF. A sentence, i.e., an utterance of a sentence, can have as many forces as there are uses to which the given sentence can be put in a context. Whether the utterance of a sentence has this or that IF depends on many factors such as, for example, attitude of the speaker (utterer) towards what is being said, previous discourse, beliefs the speaker has about the world and the addressee, socio-cultural setting, etc.[3] It is worth pointing out, however, that some types of sentences are biased to certain types of SA's. Interrogative sentences, for instance, are biased towards Questions and Requests rather than towards Threats, imperative sentences are biased towards Commands, etc.[4]

It must be emphasized that recently a dood deal of research has been devoted to syntactic means the English language uses to signal certain types of speech acts. Compare (1-4) below:

(1) Can you give me 10 dollars?
(2) Sure, if you want more, just tell me.
(3) I'm very sorry, but I've just paid my electricity bill.
(4) Yes, I can, but I am not going to give you 10 dollars.

(1) is ambiguous between two forces; that of a Request IF_R and that of a Question IF_Q. That (1) can be used with the question force IF_Q is demonstrated in (4) which is an answer to (1). The question interpretation IF_Q for (1) can be analysed as follows. The addressee, most probably, takes (1) to be a request for money. For some reason which is irrelevant for the discussion here he, the addressee, pretends that he is not aware of the fact that the speaker intends (1) to be taken as a request for money. Since (1) does not contain any overt signals of the request-force (force is not transparent here) the addressee can, in principle, take it to be a question, and thus deceive the speaker.[5]

Needless to say, the intention of the speaker in uttering (1) is that the addressee takes (1) as a request. The IF_R interpretation for (1) is the preferred one due to the presence of the verb "give" and the modal "can". However, as has been said above, the

addressee does not have to recognize this preferred reading.

However, there is a way to make (1) unambiguous as to the force. It has been recognized (Sadock 1974) that sentences with the force of requests take "please", whereas sentences with the force of questions do not. Compare (5-7):

(5) Please, can you give me 10 dollars?
(6) Can you give me lo dollars, please?
(7) Can you please give me 10 dollars?

In the foregoing discussion it has been pointed out that the two terms: Interrogative Sentence and Question should be kept apart.. Interrogation is a name for the grammatical mood of a sentence whereas Question is a name for the speech act. This terminological distinction will be observed throughout the present study.

2. THE STRUCTURE OF A SPEECH ACT

In this section we shall discuss problems pertaining to the structure of a speech act.

At the outset it must be stated that despite all the research that has been done so far in the framework of SAT little attention has been devoted to a model of a speech act.

Sørensen (1976) has presented what he calls "general main features of a speech act." For lack of space his diagram will be divided into three parts; Fig. 1, Fig. 2, and Fig. 3.



FIG. 1.



FIG. 2.



FIG. 3.

It is clear from Fig. 1, that Sørensen analyzed SA's on two levels: the level of Content (semantic and pragmatic) and the level of Form (syntactic). Admittedly, this

is a convenient way of dealing with a SA. The syntactic level (Form) of a SA is given in the surface form of the utterance which constitutes the given SA. The level of semantic and pragmatic content of a SA is whatever makes the given utterance a felicitous SA in the given context.[6] It must be stated that Sørensen's attempt at the presentation of a model of analysis of SA is worth attention. However, one can have doubts as to whether the divisions he is making are acceptable. For one thing, at least, they are not acceptable to those who are not in favor of the separation between syntax and semantics.

We shall follow Morgan (1975) who distinguishes two subsystems in the study of linguistic acts; a syntacticosemantic component and a pragmatic component. Assuming that Morgan's conception is basically correct we shall conceive of SAT as consisting of a syntacticosemantic component and a pragmatic component.[7]

As is well known, the basic unit of analysis (cf., Stalnaker 1972) at the level of syntax is a sentence and the basic unit of analysis at the level of semantics is a proposition. We shall follow Stalnaker (1972) and Searle (1969) and assume that the basic unit of analysis at the pragmatic level is a SA. However, SA's involve sentences because it is the utterance of a sentence in a context that constitutes the performance of a speech act.

The above remarks will suffice to observe that the divisions between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics are not crystal clear. We shall postulate that an analysis of a SA must take into consideration the following factors:

1. The syntactic form of sentences the utterances of which constitutes the performance of the given speech act.
2. The propositional content of the sentence the utterance of which constitutes the performance of the SA.
3. The semantic presuppositions of the sentence... (in the sense of Stalnaker 1972).
4. The form of the performative clause which represents the illocutionary force of the sentence.
5. The pragmatic presuppositions of the speaker.

6. Conversational principles characterizing the given SA.

7. Socio-cultural context in which the given SA is used.

Additionally, it is assumed that (1-4) are provided by a grammar of a generative type and they constitute part of the syntacticosemantic component of SAT. (5-7) constitute part of the pragmatic component of SAT.

3. QUESTIONS AS SPEECH ACTS

Let us now see how (1-7) can help us to characterize Question as a Direct Speech Act. Assuming that a generative grammar (of the type proposed by generative semanticists) has produced the surface form of a sentence we shall take it for granted that (1-4) have been satisfied. We must add, however, that a typical syntactic form of the sentence the utterance of which constitutes the performance of a direct question is the Interrogative with or without a Question Word (QW). Because of this condition on direct questions, (8) below is not a direct question but (9) is.

(8) I don't think I've ever met him.
(9) Who is he?

Now we shall be concerned with the presuppositions the speakers have upon uttering an interrogative sentence with the intention to use the sentence with the question - force. We shall begin by considering interrogative sentences without QW's.

Propositions of interrogative sentences play a role in establishing what the speaker presupposes upon uttering them with the intention to ask a question. For the sake of brevity we shall use "question" whenever we mean "an interrogative sentence uttered with the force of a question".

We propose that questions be derived from two distinct propositional structures:

Type I - which contains a disjunction of two (or more) propositions

Type II- which contains a proposition with an indefinite NP.

Type I is the underlying propositional structure for Disjunctive Questions (DS) and Type II is the underlying propositional structure for Special Questions (SQ). We shall

consider both types in order.

Type I. The Pragmatic Presupposition that the speaker associated with this type of propositional structure is that one of the disjuncts is true. By uttering a question containing this type of propositional structure the speaker is asking the addressee for the identification of the true proposition. The above treatment of DS's is in keeping with Chafe (1970), Katz (1972), and Kuroda (1974), and Moravcsik (1971). Details concerning this type of questions will be considered in Chapter 4.

Thus (10) can be analyzed as follows:

(10) Q: Is John a fool?
PS: ((John is a fool)$_{S1}$ (John is not a fool))$_{S2}$
PP: S_1 is true or S_2 is true
where: Q = Question,
PP= Pragmatic Presupposition
PS= Propositional Structure

The PS for (10) is shown in (11).

(11)



A sub-type of Type I is shown in (12) and (13).

(12) Q: Did you kiss Susan or Betty?
PS: (You kissed Susan or Betty)$_{S1}$ (You didn't kiss Susan or Betty)$_{S2}$
PP: S_1 us true or S_2 is true

(13) Q: Did you kiss Susan or Betty?
PS: (You kissed Susan)$_{S1}$ (You kissed Betty)$_{S2}$
PP: S_1 is true or S_2 is true

Basically, both (12) and (13) represent the same PS as (10). However, (12) can be ambiguous. The ambiguity of (12) results from the fact that "or" has two properties; it can be taken either in the exclusive sense or in the inclusive sense (cf., McCawley 1970: 239). It should be added that the ambiguity demonstrated in (12) and (13) is reflected in the type of answer (12) and (13) elicit. Notice that (14) can be used as an answer to (13) rather than to (12).

(14) I kissed Susan.

More attention will be given to questions like the ones in (12) and (13) in Chapter 4.

Type II. To this type belong Special Questions which are characterized by having a proposition with an indefinite NP. The speaker in uttering a Special Question presupposes the truth of the proposition and is asking the addressee to identify the referent of the NP occuring in the proposition.

(15) Q: Where is the money?
PS: (Money is at (Place)$_{NP}$)$_S$
PP: It is true that there is such (Place)$_{NP}$ that S

One can distinguish eight sub-types of SQ's depending on the type of indefinite NP occuring in the proposition. It will be shown in Chapter III that there exist eight types of QW's in English and Polish corresponding to indefinite NP's in the prepositions. The inventory of these eight types of indefinite NP's is shown in (16).

(16) a. It is true that there is such (Person)$_{NP}$ that S =
Question Words of Person

b. It is true that there is such (Thing)$_{NP}$ that S =
Question Words of Thing

c. It is true that there is such (Place)$_{NP}$ that S =
Question Words of Place

d. It is true that there is such (Time)$_{NP}$ that S =
Question Words of Time

e. It is true that there is such (Reason)$_{NP}$ that S =
Question Words of Reason

f. It is true that there is such (Manner)$_{NP}$ that S =
Question Words of Manner

g. It is true that there is such (Degree)$_{NP}$ that S =
Question Words of Degree

h. It is true that there is such (Quantity)$_{NP}$ that S =
Question Words of Quantity

An important thing to be noted about NP's occuring in the propositions for SQ's is that they are all marked with the feature (- Definite). However, their potential definiteness is presupposed by the speaker. We shall deal with these matters in Chapter 3.

It should be borne in mind that given the proposition and the presupposition of a SQ we can interpret this question if we describe the QW occuring in the given SQ. We mean here a semantic description of the QW. For this reason our analysis of SQ's in English and Polish will be limited to the semantics of QW's.

In the foregoing discussion we concentrated our attention on DQ's and SQ's in English but whatever has been said about questions as speech acts in English so far applies to questions as speech acts in Polish. We are not concerned in this study with the surface structures of questions in English and Polish but it should be clear that this must be taken care of by the language specific rules, in this case English and Polish. Nevertheless, it can be said that the syntactic shape of the interrogative sentence which is the syntactic mould for questions will be different in Polish and English. In other words, different results will be obtained in English and Polish will respect to factor 1. Also different results will be obtained with respect to factor 7. It will be claimed, however, that English and Polish questions are identical as to their propositional and presuppositional content.

Having discussed the presuppositional content of Question let us now pass on to the discussion of the form of the performative clause representing the illocutionary force of questions.

Gordon and Lakoff (1971) proposed that the performative clause for questions should be "I request you that you tell me..." and we shall follow Gordon and Lakoff and assume that the performative clause for questions is of the form shown in (17).[8]

(17) I request you that you tell me....

We assume that the structure in (18) accounts for questions.

(18)



The structure in (18) will be called the Performative Complex (cf., Krzeszowski 1974). We think that the Performative Complex in (18) properly accounts for the illocutionary force of questions. It is worth mentioning that essential for the correct description of questions is the form of S_2 because it becomes the surface structure, i.e. the sentence the utterance of which constitutes the performance of the act of questioning. In Previous treatments, including Gordon and Lakoff (1971) this has been neglected. Being of an opinion that performative clauses are not attached to surface forms we propose that the S which is embedded in the Performative Complex represents a proposition. Accordingly we shall have two types of structures embedded in the Performative Complex. One type corresponds to DQ's and another one to SQ's: (19) and (20), respectively.

(19)



(20)



As is well known the Performative Complex has been postulated to account for the illocutionary Force of the sentence which it dominates. In addition to this, the Performative Complex plays a role in the process of assigning proper intonation contours to the sentences it dominates. Technically, this is connectud with the application of the Performative Deletion Rule (Ross 1970). We shall not deal with the Performative Deletion Rule for reasons of scope.

Suffices it to say that in the case of questions the rule attaching the Performative Complex of the form given in (17) could apply only if the proposition is of the following form:

a. it is a disjunction of two propositions (Type I)
b. it is a proposition with an indefinite NP (Type II)[9]

So far we have dealt with the first five criteria of analysing questions as speech acts. It is time now to consider the conversational principles which are seen as conditions on the felicity of questions. We shall follow Belnap (1969) and use his term "erotetic situation", i.e., the asking-questions-in-circumstances. It must be pointed out that although a few authors (e.g. Searle 1970, Gordon and Lakoff 1971, Lakoff 1972) allude to conditions on the felicity of questions this problem has not received a thorough investigation. What follows is an attempt at a description of a typical or ideal cooperation of the speaker and the addressee in an erotetic situation. For the sake of brevity we shall use the following symbolism:

S = the speaker
H = the addressee
Q = the asking of a question
R = the state of affairs (non-linguistic)
A = the answer
PP = S's pragmatic presupposition

Assuming that the above are the necessary and sufficient constituents of an eroteric situation, we propose that the following conditions must be fulfilled for a question to be felicitous.

(21)
1. S is ignorant of R
2. S wants to know R
3. S believes that he will know R if and only if Q
10. H is not ignorant of R
11. H wants to supply R
12. H believes that S will know R if and only if A

4. S believes that H knows R
5. S believes that H is willing to share R with him
6. S believes that H will supply A
7. S believes that R is present in A
8. S believes that Q is appropriate in erotetic situation
9. In asking Q, S has PP such that PP is true

13. H believes that S does not know R
14. H believes that S believes that H is willing to share R with him.
15. H believes that S will be satisfied with A
16. H is confident that R is present in A
17. H believes that A is appropriate in erotetic situation
18. In answering to Q, H is sharing S's PP

19. Q is appropriate in erotetic situation
20. A is true
21. PP is true

One interesting thing to be noticed about (21) is a certain correspondence that exists between the speaker-based assumptions (21_{1-9}) and the hearer-based assumptions (21_{10-18}) we shall call them S-A_{SS} and H-A_{SS}, respectively. The correspondence can be explained in the following way. The speaker is making assumptions (holding beliefs, etc) about the speech situation, the addressee, and the state of affairs that is the object of the eroteric situation. If the addressee is to cooperate with the speaker in carrying on the communication enterprise he must recognize and accept as true the assumption made by the speaker and whatever is present in the communicative situation due to general rules of conversational implicature (e.g., Grice's Conversational Implicature). In other words the speaker and the addressee must respect each other's assumptions given in (21).

In this study we have been concerned with questions and it must be stressed that (21) has been proposed to define eroteric situations. However, it should be possible, we think, to postulate similar principles for other speech situations.

On the basis of (21) we can now propose two general rules which we shall call Rules of Conversational Cooperation.

Rule 1. Each S-A_{SS} has a corresponding H-A_{SS}

Rule 2. What is not present in S-A_{SS} and H-A_{SS} is taken to be true.

If Rule 1 and Rule 2 are observed by both S and H then we can say that there exists a maximum uptake (Austin's term).

Needless to say, (21) describes an ideal eroteric situation. In everyday life (21_{1-21}) are often violated or the participants of the communicative situation suspect that they are or will be violated. An analysis of the ways of violating (21) would certainly make an interesting study.

Below are a few examples where one of the conditions has been violated. Numbers to the right of sentences indicate the condition in (21) that has been violated.

(22) Where is the post office, if you know. (4)
(23) What time is it but I know it's 4. (1)
(24) Why have you done this but I won't ask you. (8)

So far we have dealt with six factors contributing to the analysis of questions as speech acts. We have not touched upon the seventh factor yet, i.e. socio-cultural conditions. By socio-cultural conditions we mean very general rules of social behavior which linguistic communication is a part of. It is impossible to go into any detail concerning the analysis of social behavior in this study. It suffices to notice that there are situations in which asking questions would be considered to be inappropriate. For example, it would be out of place to ask a pianist adjusting her chair right before the concert in, say, Carnegie Hall, by uttering (25).

(25) Where have you bought this beautiful dress?

Impressionistically, we can say that (25) violates at least two rules of social behavior. First, it breaks into the pianist's privacy and second, it imposes the speaker's desire for imformation upon the audience who may not wish to share this information with him. There is nothing wrong, however, with (25) when asked after the concert. The pianist should even feel complimented. Thus we have seen how the speech situation affects the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a speech act. It can be added that appropriateness of speech acts in the given speech situation can throw some light on the communicative content of a particular speech act. Notice that (25), on the second reading, i.e., when uttered after the concert, can be close in meaning to (26) where the question force disappears.

(26) I like your dress.

Also notice that the artist could react to (25) having a reading as in (26) with something like (27).

(27) Oh, thank you, it's very kind of you.

Coming back to questions we can say that asking a question will not be appropriate if any of the rules of Conversational Cooperation postulated earlier in this section is violated and/or if the question is asked in a context in which one does not expect an eroteric situation to occur.[10]

We shall not devote more attention to problems of socio-cultural conditions pertaining to the appropriateness of questions but it is believed that research in this field can throw some light upon the interaction between the rules of linguistic behavior and the rules of a more general nature, i.e., the rules of social behavior.

In this section not much has been said about a possibliity of a contrastive treatment of matters pertaining to the appropriateness of questions. This is due to the fact that whatever has been said so far applies to questions as speech acts both in English and Polish. Accordingly, the same set of criteria must be used in deciding about the structure of a speech act or the appropriateness of its use irrespectively of the language in which the given speech act is realized. This guarantees that the criteria we proposed for the analysis of questions are not language specific but apply across many languages and are thus universal. It must be stressed with considerable strength that the principle of universality does not or may not apply in the case of the socio-cultural factor. It may very well be the case that a speech act is used in a certain situation in one society but it may not be used in the same situation in another. For example, in Poland it is quite acceptable and, in fact, often done that one says " thank you" when getting from the table after a meal. Nothing like this is said in Britain or U.S. One can therefore assume that speakers representing different cultures vary as to the application of speech acts relative to the situation in which the given speech act is used. A study of the socio-cultural contexts in which a speech act is used by the speakers of language L_1 and L_2:..

etc., can prove insightful for all those who are interested not only in how language is structured but also in how language functions. As is well known such matters have not been dealt with in most of the exisiting contrastive analyses.

SUMMARY

In this chapter we have introduced a distinction between two terms: Interrogation and Question. The former stands for the syntactic mood of a sentence and the latter stands for the name of a particular speech act. Then we have proposed seven criteria on the basis of which Question can be analyzed as a Direct Speech Act. It has been demonstrated that Question can be adequately described if the following factors are taken into condiseration:

1. The interrogative mood of the sentence the utterance of which constitutes the performance of a question

2. Two types of propositional structure:
   a. a disjunction of two propositions
   b. a proposition with an indefinite NP.
   The former corresponds to Disjunctive Questions and the latter corresponds to Special Questions.

3. The pragmatic presupposition for Question has been defined as the propositional attitude of the speaker. In the case of a Disjunctive Question the speaker presupposes that one of the propositions is true and asks for the specification of the one which is true. In the case of Special Questions the speaker presupposes the truth of the proposition which contains an indefinite NP and asks for the specification of the referent of this NP.

4. The Performative Complex for Disjunctive Questions and Special Questions is of the form "I request you that you tell me".

5. The rules of Conversational Cooperation proposed in this study, together with the felicity conditions (21_{1-21}) on questions and general rules of linguistic behavior decide about the appropriateness of questions in the given context.
   Two rules of Conversational Cooperation have been proposed:
   Rule 1: Each S-A_{SS} has a corresponding H-A_{SS}
   Rule 2: What is not present in S-A_{SS} and H-A_{SS} is taken to be true.
   The same set of criteria has been proposed to deal with questions in English and Polish.

6. The socio-cultural context in which a speech act is used can be different due to cross-cultural differences among speech communities.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1

A thorough discussion in Interrogation can be found in Cygan (1973) who also presents a historical panorama of the problems involved in the classification of sentence types in general and interrogative sentences in particular.

2

As for the Polish terminology the following pair of terms seems to be in current use: Zdanie Pytajne for "interrogative sentence", and Pytanie for "question". Cf., Polański (1967), Rubiński (1970), Cackowski (1964). However, Cygan uses "zdanie pytające"(Cygan 1973). These terminological problems are absent from the logistic literature. In the so-called erotetic logic a distinction is made between "question" and "interrogative sentence". Question is characterized by a formal apparatus of logic and can be expressed in a natural language via interrogative sentences. Belnap (1969:24) states the following in connection with the distinction between Interrogation and Question:

> "By question I mean "what is asked" by the use of an interrogative, hence something more abstract, so that a single question can be put by the use of any one of several interrogatives. Question then stands to interrogative as proposition or statement stands to sentence."

It must be borne in mind that sentences are associated with illocutionary forces only indirectly, i.e., via utterances.

3

For a different approach to these problems cf., Daneš (1964), especially his "theory of utterance". A discussion on Daneš' proposals can be found in Szwedek (1975).

4

"Request" stands here for a type of a speech act and should be distinguished from other types, e.g., Question. Syntactic differences between questions and requests have been discussed in Sadock (1974). On the other hand, the term "request" has been used by some authors in the sense of "a request for information". This use of "request" can not be mixed up with the use of "Request" in the sense given above. One could probably discuss the issue of whether Question and Request are distinct speech acts. Taking into account the pragmatic aspect they seem to be distinct speech acts.

5

Cf., Morgan (1975) on the notion "pragmatically transparent".

6

Cf., Maas (1973) who deals with the semantics of speech acts.

7

Ross (1975) argues for the postulation of a unified component in which pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic rules are interspersed in various ways. The study of such "mixed" phenomena he calls Pragmantax.

8

The postulation of the verb "request" as the highest performative verb in the Performative Complex for questions and requests can be motivated syntactically; both questions and requests are conveyed by means of interrogative sentences.

9 Travis (1971) has attempted a "generative grammar of illocutions" but his proposal does not seem to have attracted much attention.

10 Cf., Lakoff (1973) on politeness in questions , also cf., Oleksy (1979) on felicity conditions and questions.

CHAPTER 3

SPECIAL QUESTIONS IN ENGLISH AND POLISH

1. OCCURRENCES OF QUESTION WORDS IN ENGLISH AND POLISH

The analysis of Special Questions (SQ) in English and Polish will be reduced to the description of Question Words (QW) assuming that the Propositional Structure and the Pragmatic Presupposition account for whatever is needed for the semantic interpretation of SQ's.

The discussion on QW's in English and Polish will be performed in four stages.First, we shall briefly discuss some syntactic properties of SQ's. Second, we shall deal with the positions QW's occupy in SQ's in English and Polish. Third, we shall review some problems connected with the classification of QW's. Finally. we shall propose an analysis of QW's that seems promising for the description of QW's in English and Polish.

Syntactically, SQ's are characterized by possessing the interrogative word order and interrogative words. On the surface there exist significant structural differences between DQ's and SQ's on the one hand, and between SQ's asking about the subject and other SQ's on the other hand [1]. These differences can be related to different derivational histories of forms in question. (Cf., for example, Thomas and Kintgen 1974:179-188).

The difference between SQ's in English and their counterparts in Polish is that the former preserve the interrogative word order of the DQ, adding a QW in front of the interrogative structure, whereas the latter substitute the QW for the interrogative particle "czy" of the DQ.

Details concerning the derivation of SQ's in English within a transformational framework can be found in works cited here and in practically every handbook of grammar of English.

The relevant literature on the analysis of SQ's in Polish is less abundant; Krasnowolski (1897), Urbańczyk (1939), Klemensiewicz (1948), Szober (1963), and Jodłowski (1976) are, to the knowledge of the author, the representatives in this category [2]. The situation is no better when it comes to the contrastive analysis of SQ's in English and Polish. Here we can mention but a few names,for instance; Krzeszowski (1974), Cygan (1967, and 1973).

Szwedek (1975), Oleksy (1976, 1978), and Fisiak et al (1978).

A discussion on the transformational behaviour of SQ's in English and Polish will not be attempted here. (cf., Fisiak et al 1978 on these matters). It suffices to say that the derivation of SQ's in English involves, basically, two transformational rules; WH-Fronting and Aux-Attraction. In Polish, on the other hand, Aux-Attraction is not used.[3]

As we said above, in both languages QW's occupy the initial position in SQ's; this seems to be a general rule for both English and Polish SQ's. Let us now discuss some of the interrogative constructions in English and Polish where the initial position of QW's is not preserved. We have used the expression "interrogative constructions" instead of "questions" because some of these constructions do not convey meanings that are normally associated with questions.

It is possible for a QW in both languages to occur finally, as is the case in (1) and (2).

(1) She slept Where?
(2) (Ona) spała Gdzie?

It will be claimed that (1) and (2) are not genuine SQ's. (1) and (2) can be analyzed in the following way. The speaker who utters (1) in English or (2) in Polish does not express lack of information concerning someone's place of sleeping; rather, he is asking the addressee for the repetition of a genuine SQ, e.g., (3) in English or (4) in Polish. (3) and (4) might have been uttered in the previous discourse but the speaker is not absolutely certain whether he is right in taking the previous discourse to have been (3) or (4). The speaker is, as if, checking whether his assumptions about the previous discourse are correct.

(3) Where did she sleep?
(4) Gdzie (ona) spała?

(1) and (2) can be interpreted in a still different way. The speaker in uttering (1) in English or (2) in Polish can also express a certain surprise about the state of affairs conveyed in what he takes to have been the previous discourse. In this case he might

be checking whether the previous discourse had been something like (5) in English and (6) in Polish.[5]

(5) Yesterday, she slept in the waiting-room.
(6) Wczoraj (ona) spała w poczekalni.

Now, if the above is the case, (1) and (2) can be conveying something like (7) and (8), respectively for English and Polish.

(7) Did you (really) say that she had slept in the waiting-room?
(8) Czy ty (rzeczywiście) powiedziałeś, że ona spała w poczekalni?

Common to both interpretations of (1) and (2) is that they are questions about the previous discourse, i.e., they are echo-questions. The above examples show, we think, that utterances like those in (1) and (2) rarely function as SQ's in English and Polish.[6] The problems of non-initial occurrences of QW's in English are treated with some detail in Jespersen (1954: 487) and Quirk et al (1972: 408).

We can also note that both languages allow for more than one QW per question. Here, again, the basic difference between English and Polish is that the former does not permit more than one QW to appear initially whereas the latter does. This is demonstrated in the examples below:

(9) Who went where?
(10) Kto poszedł gdzie?
(11) Kto gdzie poszedł?
* (12) Who where went?

According to Stockwell et al (1973: 620) the ungrammaticality of (12) is due to the fact that English rules out the stranding of QW's. However, Jespersen (1954: 488) gives examples of two QW's in English occurring initially, as in (13).

(13) That's why - Why what, child?

It seems to us that Jespersen's examples do not disprove the contention made above to the effect that English does not allow for more than one QW per question. "Why what, child?", in (13) is not a genuine question; its function is to obtain something that has been omitted in the previous discourse and is thus similar in function to an echo-question.

Another feature common to English and Polish SQ's is their ability to place two different QW's initially if they are conjoined by means of "and", and "i", respectively for English and Polish. Compare the examples below:

(14) How and when did you find the key?
(15) Jak i kiedy znalazłeś klucz?
(16) Where and when did you see the accident?
(17) Gdzie i kiedy widziałeś wypadek?

Notice that (14-17) can be derived from (18-21).

(18) How did you find the key and when?
(19) Jak znalazłeś klucz i kiedy?
(20) Where did you see the accident and when?
(21) Gdzie widziałeś wypadek i kiedy?

(18-21), in turn, can be derived from (22-25).

(22) How did you find the key and when did you find the key?
(23) Jak znalazłeś klucz i kiedy znalazłeś klucz?
(24) Where did you see the accident and when did you see the accident?
(25) Gdzie widziałeś wypadek i kiedy widziałeś wypadek?

It will be proposed that the derivation of (14-17) from (18-21) has been the result of the application of a transformational rule proposed by Ross (1969). Ross' name for the transformational rule is "sluicing". Most generally, sluicing is a deletion transformation which has the effect of deleting everything but the preposed questioned constituent under the condition that the remainder of the question is identical to some other part of the sentence (Ross 1969: 257).[7]

Although Sluicing was proposed for embedded questions only, it seems that the rule is more effective than it has originally been designed to be: it can be applied to derive conjoined questions as well. The process of deriving (14-17) from (18-21) could be shortly described as follows: the structures in (22-25) undergo a transformation which has the effect of preposing the material left over in the second conjunct after the application of the rule of Sluicing, i.e. "and when", "kiedy" etc., and placing this material right after the interrogative word of the first conjunct.

It can be added in passing that both languages allow for sequences of QW's as in (26-27).

(26) Why, when and where did you do it?
(27) Dlaczego, kiedy i gdzie to zrobiłeś?

One might postulate the derivation of (26-27) along the lines proposed for the derivation of (14-17). The rule of Sluicing would have to be applied several times depending on the number of the conjoined sentences. All occurences of "and" would be deleted except before the last QW in the sequence. Thus questions like those in (26-27) would be treated as being derived from three conjoined sentences. The above proposed derivation of (26-27) is in keeping with the remark made by Stockwell et al (1973; 628) who state the following: "A sentence with WH can be conjoined only with another sentence containing WH".

In the above section we have shown how to derive conjoined questions in English and Polish. SQ's containing QW's conjoined by means of "and" were shown to be derived from independent interrogative sentences. Despite the very general character of the proposal it proved helpful in accounting for the derivation of conjoined SQ's in English and Polish.[8]

It can be added that SQ's containing conjoined QW's in initial positions (14-17, 26-27) as well as SQ's containing QW's in noninitial position (18-19) fall within the category of Multiple Questions. A detailed discussion on the transformational treatment of Multiple Questions in English can be found in Bach (1970), Baker (1970), Kuno and Robinson(1971), and Leech and Svartvik (1975).[9]

2. CLASSIFICATION OF QUESTION WORDS

Having briefly sketched some syntactic properties of SQ's in English and Polish we can now pass to the analysis of QW's in both languages. At the outset we shall briefly discuss some problems involved in the classification of QW's in English and Polish.

QW's in English have often been classified as belonging to two syntactic categories; interrogative pronouns (who what, etc.,) and interrogative adverbs (where, why, etc.,

cf., in this respect Jespersen 1954, Cygan 1973).

Jodłowski (1976:19-20) classifies all interrogative words in Polish as belonging to the category of pronouns. He distinguishes four sub-types of interrogative pronouns in Polish: zaimek przymiotny (adjective pronoun), zaimek rzeczowny (substantive pronoun), zaimek przysłowny (adverbial pronoun), and zaimek liczebny (numeral pronoun)[10]. Jodłowski's classification of interrogative pronouns is shown in Fig. 1.

INTERROGATIVE ADJECTIVE PRONOUN : JAKI, KTÓRY, CZYJ

INTERROGATIVE SUBSTANTIVE PRONOUN : KTO, CO

INTERROGATIVE NUMERAL PRONOUN : ILE, ILU

INTERROGATIVE ADVERBIAL PRONOUN : JAK, GDZIE, KIEDY, DOKĄD, SKĄD, KTÓRĘDY[11]

FIG. 1.

We shall not be concerned with the syntactic behaviour of interrogative words but with their semantic and communicative values in SQ's. For this reason the term Question Word (QW) covers all types of interrogative words which occur in SQ's.

It has been common among grammarians to assume that there are nine WQ's in English:

1. WHO
2. WHAT
3. WHICH
4. WHOSE
5. WHOM
6. HOW
7. WHY
8. WHERE
9. WHEN

Following Jodłowski (1976) we could enumerate fourteen QW's in Polish:

1. KTO
2. CO
3. JAKI
4. KTÓRY
5. CZYJ
6. JAK
7. DLACZEGO
8. GDZIE
9. DOKĄD
10. SKĄD
11. KTÓRĘDY
12. KIEDY
13. ODKĄD
14. ILE[12]

It is easy to notice that there is a difference in number between QW's in English and QW's in Polish. This is shown in the two classifications presented above. The difference in number between QW's in English and QW's in Polish seems to result from the fact that

Polish has independent one-word forms, i.e., "dokąd", "skąd", etc., where English makes use of a combination: QW + Preposition, i.e., "where", "where from", etc., compare the following pairs of SQ's.

(28) Where is the bus going to?
(29) Dokąd jedzie (ten) autobus?
(30) Where do you come from?
(31) Skąd pochodzisz?
(32) Which way shall we go?
(33) Którędy pójdziemy?

[13]

Moreover, "ile" in Polish (again, a one-word QW) can be rendered in English as how much/many".

(34) How much money have you got?
(35) Ile masz pieniędzy?
(36) How many mistakes have you made?
(37) Ile zrobiłeś błędów?

Furthermore, difficulties arise when case, number, and gender are taken into consideration. As is well known, interrogative pronouns in Polish are overtly marked for case, number, and gender, which is not the case with interrogative pronouns in English, except for the objective and genitive forms of Who, i.e., Whom and Whose, respectively. If a contrastive analysis of QW's in English and Polish is performed on the level of surface representation, then the English forms will have to be contrasted with a vast number of inflected Polish forms. For example, Which in English can be rendered in Polish as: Który, Którego, Którym, Któremu, Którzy, Których, etc.

It is possible in Polish to form SQ's by adding a special morpheme (-ż,-że) to a QW. This morpheme is incorporated into the QW.[14] SQ's containing QW's with these morphemes have a certain amount of emotional colouring. QW's containing the two morphemes will be called Emotive Question Words (EQW) and SA's containing EQW's will be called Emotive Special Questions (ESQ). Fig. 2 shows an inventory of normal, i.e., non-emotive QW's and EQW's.

NON-EMOTIVE QW's	EMOTIVE QW's
Kto	Któż
Co	Cóż
Jaki, Jaka Jakie	Jakiż, Jakaż, Jakież
Który, Która, Które	Któryż, Któraż, Któreż

Czyj, Czyja, Czyje	Czyjż, Czyjaż, Czyjeż
Jak	Jakże-Jakżeż
Dlaczego	Dlaczegoż
Gdzie	Gdzież
Dokąd	Dokądże
Skąd	Skądże
Którędy	Którędyż
Kiedy	Kiedyż
Odkąd	Odkądże
Ile	Ileż

In English, ESQ's can be formed either by adding "ever" after a QW or by adding a special phrase after a QW, e.g.; "on earth", "the devil", "in heaven's name", etc. The latter device is also used in Polish ESQ's e.g.; " u licha", "do diabła", etc., are inserted in a SQ.[15] Compare the examples below:

(38) What are you doing?
(39) Co robisz?
(40) What ever are you doing?
(41) Cóż ty robisz?
(42) What the devil are you doing?
(43) Co do diabła robisz?

According to Jespersen (1954: 419), (38) expresses simple curiosity, (40) expresses surprise, and (42) expresses anger. It seems that the respective Polish versions (39, 41 and 43) convey exactly the same shades of meaning as do their English counterparts. Thus one can say that (38-43) convey emotional attitudes of the speaker: they are ESQ's in English and Polish.

Some QW's in Polish incorporate the morpheme which marks person (-ś, -śmy, -ście), respectively for second person singular, first, and second persons plural.

(44) Gdzie wczoraj byłeś (Where were you yesterday?)
(45) Gdzieś wczoraj był? "
(46) Gdzie wczoraj byliśmy? (Where were we yesterday?)
(47) Gdzieśmy wczoraj byli? "
(48) Gdzie wczoraj byliście? (Where were you yesterday?)
(49) Gdzieście wczoraj byli? "

SQ's in Polish with QW's formed as in (45), (47), and (49) seem to be commonly used in everyday speech. It must be pointed out that forms like, i.e. "gdzieśmy", "kiedyście", etc., are not treated here as a sub-type of QW's in Polish because their occurence is limited:

1. They never occur without morphemes (-ś, -śmy, and -ście), indicating person in predicates expressed by verbs in the Past Tense. For this reason (50) is ungrammatical as a SQ in Polish.

* (50) Kiedyś napiszesz ten list? (When will you write this letter?)

2. The movement of the morphemes (-ś, -śmy, and -ście) out of the verb is possible only when the person indicated by these morphemes is the person to whom the question is addressed, hence the ungrammaticality of (51).

*(51) Dlaczegoś ona prowadziła samochód? (why did she drive the car?)

One can notice that any comparison of QW's in English and Polish cannot be reduced to the above mentioned forms because there exist in English combinations of the type: QW + Preposition (we can call these combinations "question word phrases"), e.g. "Who at", "Who with", etc., on the one hand, and there is a phenomenon of substitution ("question word substitution") on the other. By "question word substitution" we mean cases where, for instance, "When" is substituted by "Which time", "Which day", etc., depending on the amount of detail that is expected in the answer. Question word substitution in the above sense seems to be applicable to Polish SQ's as well.

(52) When are they coming from Paris?
(53) Which day are they coming from Paris?
(54) Kiedy przyjeżdżają z Paryża?
(55) Którego dnia przyjeżdżają z Paryża?

Likewise, "why" in English can be substituted by "What for", and "Dlaczego" in Polish can be substituted by "po co". However, "Why" and "Dlaczego" can be asking both about Cause and Purpose, while "What ... for" and "Po co" are asking about Purpose. (cf., Oleksy 1976).

The above examples seem to show that a contrastive analysis of QW's in English and Polish is becoming complicated; not only must we decide which English forms correspond to which Polish forms but also we must solve many puzzling cases where the meaning of a QW changes, or rather, a QW assumes a different meaning. To illustrate this we shall consider one case in which the occurence of a QW in one context can not be related to a typical meaning of the given QW. Such is the case with "Co" in (56) below.

(56) Co się tak gapisz na mnie?

"Co" in (56) can not be rendered as "What" in English and (57) is ungrammatical.

*(57) What are you staring at me?

Under closer inspection, however, "Co" in (56) appears to be related to "Dlaczego", as in (58).

(58) Dlaczego się tak gapisz na mnie?

(58) can now be rendered in English as (59).

(59) Why are you staring at me?

The above examples show that, contextually, "Co" in Polish and "Why" in English can be related. A natural question arises whether "Co" in Polish means "Why" in English. A contrastive analysis of these two items based on their surface occurrences suggests that it does. However, it must be emphasized that the type of relationship that is holding between "Co" in (56) and "Why" in (59) has more to do with what their respective underlying representations are. It is there where "Co" and "Why" are found to be equivalent.

One can also notice that both in the case of a question word phrase (28-33) as well as a question word substitution (52-55) such forms as "Where to" and Dokąd" on one hand, and "When" and "Which day" together with their Polish renderings on the other hand, can be related to their underlying representations. What exactly these underlying representations are will be demonstrated later in this chapter.

At this point we can propose that QW's in English and Polish be analyzed at the level of underlying, i.e. semantic representations. It follows from this approach that the equivalence relationship holding between English forms underlying surface occurrences of QW's and the corresponding Polish forms will be stated at this level as well. It is worth adding that since our analysis of QW's in English and Polish will be performed at the level of underlying representation is is immaterial at this point which English overt forms correspond to which Polish overt forms. In other words we

do not have to decide whether, for example, "How" in English can be rendered as "Jak" or as "Jaki", or both, in Polish before the underlying representation of "How" in English and "Jak" in Polish has been postulated.

We shall propose that all QW's in English and Polish SQ's be classified into the following seven types:

1. QUESTION WORDS OF PERSON
2. QUESTION WORDS OF THING
3. QUESTION WORDS OF PLACE
4. QUESTION WORDS OF TIME
5. QUESTION WORDS OF REASON
6. QUESTION WORDS OF MANNER
7. QUESTION WORDS OF DEGREE
8. QUESTION WORDS OF QUANTITY

First, we shall try to establish the respective underlying representations for each type in English and Polish. Next, we shall see how these underlying representations function in SQ's in both languages. It is assumed that after the underlying representations have been proposed the equivalence relationship holding between the respective English and Polish QW's can be stated. In this approach overt realizations of the underlying representations should not be considered a factor in the determination of equivalence relationships.[16]

3. INDEFINITENESS OF QUESTION WORDS

QW's in English have often been derived from underlying indefinite NP's. In most transformational treatments those NP's have been assigned the status of pro-forms with Wh as a scope indicator or indexer attached to them.

The arguments for deriving QW's from indefinite NP's have been discussed by

numerous authors: Ross (1967), Bach (1971), Lewandowska (1971), Stockwell et al (1973), and Oleksy (1978) among others.

However, as has been pointed out by Koutsoudas (1968: 268), some QW's e.g., When, Where, Why, and How have been derived from a slightly different underlying structure than Who, What, and Which in the analysis proposed by Katz and Postal (1964): the former, but not the latter, contain a Preposition in their underlying structures. Moreover, Katz and Postal (1964) derive When, Where, How, and Why from at what time, at what place, in what manner, and for what reason, respectively, whereas Kuroda (1968) derives these QW's from at which time, at which place, in which way, and for which reason.

The discussion seems to indicate that in the current literature the problem of definiteness versus indefiniteness of WH, and consequently of NP's underlying QW's is still an open question. The assignment of the feature (+ Definite) to NP's underlying QW's was based upon the assumption that this feature could be used to characterize "which" underlying surface occurrences of When, Where, How, and Why. Despite the fact that exactly the same surface occurrences of the above mentioned QW's were characterized as being (- Definite) by those linguists who proposed to derive When, Where, etc., from at what time, at what place, etc., the former approach was inconsistent in deriving When, Where, etc., from indefinite NP's.

In our opinion the controversy stems from a confusion of underlying semantic features, (+ Definite) and (- Definite) in this case, with the real occurrences of Which and What in the surface forms of SQ's in English, and from the fact that the semantic characterization of QW's has been equated with the pragmatic presuppositions that can be associated with QW's occurring in SQ's. This issue is dealt with in Oleksy (1978) and there is no need to repeat it here.

It has been widely acknowledged that QW's occur in SQ's to indicate the ignorance of the speaker about someone's identity or the place of event, etc., hence the

occurrences of Who, Where, etc., in the surface forms of SQ's. Who, Where, etc., occur in SQ's whenever the speaker is assuming that the entities about which these QW's are asking do exist but it is the addressee (the one who provides the answer, in this case) who has the sufficient knowledge of their identity or place of existence, etc.[17]

The acceptance of the view that NP's underlying QW's are marked as (+ Definite) would eventually lead to contradiction; the speaker in uttering a SQ containing, for instance, Who, would be referring to some entity in the outside world as being definite. However, it is difficult to see how one can refer to something as being definite without knowing what it is. More precisely, how can the speaker refer to an NP as being definite if he does not know the referent of this NP. In other words, an analysis that postulates (+ Definite) as a feature for NP's underlying QW's must explain on what grounds NP's underlying QW's can be assigned the feature (+ Definite) if the referents of these NP's are not given.

Assuming that the definiteness of NP's underlying QW's is not stated but presupposed it will be proposed that the NP's underlying QW's be marked with the feature (- Definite).

In English the feature (- Definite) has been attributed to NP's underlying QW's via WH, i.e., it has been attached to WH. The postulation of WH in underlying representation of QW's coinsides with the phonological shape of QW's in English.[18]

However, it is worth pointing out that it is not at all clear how WH functions in the grammar of English. There have been numerous, often conflicting, proposals advocated in the current literature and the discussion on the status of WH is still continuing: compare, for example, Katz and Postal (1964), Bresnan (1970), Bach (1971), Kuno and Robinson (1972), Chomsky (1973), and Langacker (1974).[19] Langacker (1974: 3) observes the following:

> "Analyses differ as to whether or not WH is to be considered meaningful... and they differ also in regard to whether WH is present in deep structure or

inserted transformationally".

Then he argues that WH in English is an overt morphological element but its "...deep structure status is unresolved". (Langacker 1974: 8).

4. A SEMANTIC DESCRIPTION OF QUESTION WORDS

In our treatment of QW's in English and Polish QW's are derived from indefinite NP's occurring in the underlying representations of SQ's. It must be stressed that the term "underlying representation" is not understood in the sense of Chomsky's (1965) "deep structure" but in the sense of semantic structure, e.g., Krzeszowski's (1974) "input structure".

We shall use the term Semantic Structure (SS) in the above sense. Moreover, we shall assume that each SS underlying a QW contains a Noun (N) and a Feature Matrix (FM). N is not a real word but a pro-form. SS's contain all information that is necessary for the semantic interpretation of QW's.

It will be postulated that FM's contain the following features: (+ Interrogative), (- Definite), and (+ Identifying), hereafter: (+ Int), (- Def), and (+ Ident), respectively.

It can be pointed out that the two features (+ Int) and (- Def) will be responsible for the triggering of QW-Movement Transformation in English and Polish[20] as well as for the phonological shape of QW's in both languages.

It must be emphasized that the postulation of the features (+ Int) and (- Def) makes it possible to distinguish between QW's on the one hand and Relative Pronouns (RP) on the other. Although a discussion on RP's would go far beyond the scope of this paper it is worth mentioning that RP's can be derived from SS's containing N's identical to the ones postulated for SS's from which QW's are derived. However, the FM's will be different from the FM's for QW's in that the former will not contain the two features (+ Int) and (- Def), but (- Int) and (+ Def).

The feature (+ Ident) is proposed in order to account for the unique function QW's perform in SQ's; they ask for the identification of individuals or states whose existence is presupposed by the speaker. QW's can thus be conceived of as devices used by the speaker to help the addressee identify these portions of context that must be specified in the answer. However, as is well known, one and the same syntactic form may be used in linguistic communication to express various discoursive functions. It is not surprising that (60) and (61) can be used to convey a request for information, i.e., they can be used as questions.

(60) What is she writing?
(61) Co ona pisze?

But it is also true that (60) and (61) can be used to convey a surprise. The traditional way of dealing with such cases has been to point out that (60) and (61) are questions and that the surprise-value of interrogative structures that are present in (60) and (61) is carried out by means of exclamatory sentences, e.g., (62) and (63), respectively.

(62) What is she writing!
(63) Co ona pisze!

It will be claimed here that the "What" in (60) and the "What" in (62) are not identical and they must be assigned distinct semantic descriptions. The same refers, needless to say, to "Co" in (61) and "Co" in (63). In the case of (60) the speaker wants the addressee to identify and specify in the answer whatever constitutes the pragmatic counterpart of What. There is nothing that must be identified in the case of (62) and (63). (62) can be uttered upon seeing something that has already been written, what is surprising is either the outcome of writing, e.g., a letter, or the contents of whatever has been written. Nothing of the kind can be said of (60) where neither an outcome of writing nor the contents of whatever has been written are given. One way of accounting for the difference in use of What and Co as exemplified in (60) and (62) and (61) and (63) is to assume that What and Co occurring in (60) and (61), respectively, are marked with the feature (+ Ident), which properly describes the

function of What and Co in SQ's

The three features (+ Int), (-Def), and (+ Ident) are postulated for all SS's underlying surface occurrences of QW's in English and Polish. Besides the three features dealt with above we shall postulate the next two features: ($\pm$ Selective) and ($\pm$ Possessive), hereafter ($\pm$ Select) and ($\pm$ Poss). Some QW's will be characterized by possessing the feature (- Select) or (- Poss).

The feature (+ Select) is postulated in order to account for the difference between Which and What on the one hand and between Który/a/e and Jaki/a/e on the other. The problem is by no means new. The relevant literature can be found in Katz and Postal (1964), Huddleston (1971), and Jackendoff (1968).

We shall agree with Huddleston (1971) that Wh element is associated with indefinite NP's. However, we shall not agree that the solution proposed by Huddleston accounts for the difference between "which books" and "what books". Leaving the NP "book" aside, we shall claim that the difference can be explained by postulating the feature (Select) which is present in the FM for Which, but is absent from the FM for What. To be more precise, we shall claim that the FM for Which contains the feature (+ Select) whereas the FM for What contains the feature (- Select).

The features (+ Select) and (-Select) are also postulated for the Polish counterparts of Which and What: respectively Który/a/e and Jaki/a/e.

It must be emphasized that the feature (+ Select) also accounts for the difference between (64) and (65), and (66) and (67).

(64) Where will you stay in Warsaw?
(65) Gdzie zatrzymasz się w Warszawie?
(66) Which hotel will you stay in Warsaw?
(67) W którym hotelu zatrzymasz się w Warszawie?

Although (64) and (66) in English, and (65) and (67) in Polish can be answered in the same way, for example, (68) for English and (69) for Polish, yet the questions containing Which (Który/a/e) are felt to be more specific than the questions containing

What (Jaki/a/e) and for this reason (70) and (71) can not be proper answers to (66) and (67).

(68) At "Forum".
(69) W "Forum".
(70) I'll stay with my aunt.
(71) Zatrzymam się u ciotki.

Also, the speaker uttering (66) or (67) presupposes (71) or (72), which is not the case with (64) and (65).

(71) You will stay at a hotel in Warsaw.
(72) Zatrzymasz się w (jakimś)hotelu w Warszawie.

Before we pass on to the discussion of the feature (Poss) it must be pointed out that not all occurrences of What in English SQ's can be related to one and the same SS. Notice the difference that exists between (73) and (74).

(73) What are you reading?
(74) What book are you reading?

(73) is asking about the identity of something that is being read, while (74) is asking about the features of the book that is being read: (74) can be roughly paraphrased as (75).

(75) What are the features of the book you are reading?

Also notice that the difference in meaning present in (73) and (74) shows up overtly in Polish: (76) is asking about the identity and (77), where the QW has a distinct phonological shape, is asking about the features of the book and can be roughly paraphrased as (78).

(76) Co czytasz?
(77) Jaką książkę czytasz?
(78) Jakie są cechy książki, którą czytasz?

It will be proposed that What corresponding to Co in Polish and What corresponding to Jaki/a/e be derived from distinct SS's. How to do this will be shown later in this chapter.

Let us now turn to the feature (Poss). This feature has been postulated in order

to account for the difference between the use of Whose and Which on the one hand, and Czyj/a/e and Który/a/e on the other: respectively,(79), (80), (81), and (82).

(79) Whose book are you reading?
(80) Czyją książkę czytasz?
(81) Which book are you reading?
(82) Którą książkę czytasz?

It seems that (79) and (80), besides asking about the identity of the book the addressee is reading, are asking about the possessor of the book the addressee is reading.[21]

Thus, (79) and (80) presupose something like (83) and (84), respectively.

(83) You are reading a book which belongs to X.
(84) Czytasz książkę, która należy to X-a.

Where "X" stands for the person to whom the book belongs.

Needless to say, (83) and (84) can not be said to have been presupposed by the speaker who uttered (81) or (82).

The semantic difference between Whose in English and its counterparts in Polish, i.e., Czyj/a/e and other QW's, can be accounted for if the feature (+ Poss) is postulated for FM's characterizing Whose and Czyj/a/e. It goes without saying that the remaining QW's will be characterized as possessing the feature (-Poss).

5. QUESTION WORDS OF PERSON AND THING

In the above section of the we have outlined the semantic features that we think should be present in FM's for QW's in English and Polish. The first two features: (+ Int) and (- Def) account for the semantic description of QW's and, in addition to that, they trigger QW-Movement Transformation. The remaining three features: (Ident), (Select), and (Poss) make it possible to distinguish among different QW's in English and Polish.

(85), (86), (87), and (88) below represent the respective FM's for Who, Whose, Which, and What as well as for their counterparts in Polish, i.e., Kto, Czyj/a/e,

Który/a/e, and Co.

(85)
+ Int
- Def
+ Ident
- Select
- Poss

(86)
+ Int
- Def
+ Ident
- Select
+ Poss

(87)
+ Int
- Def
+ Ident
+ Select
-Poss

(88)
+ Int
- Def
+ Ident
- Select
-Poss

It is easy to see that Who/Kto is different from Which/Który ... with respect to the feature (Select). Who/Kto is different from Whose/Czyj ... with respect to the feature (Poss). Which/Który, in turn, is different from Whose/Czyj ... with respect to two features: (Select) and (Poss). Finally, Who/Kto has the same FM as What/Co.

The difference between Who/Kto and What/Co is accounted for by the fact that Who/Kto is derived from the SS which contains a noun Person/Osoba whereas What/Co is derived from the SS which contains a noun Thing/Rzecz.

Earlier in this chapter we have alluded to two different uses of What in English SQ's. One of these uses corresponds to Co in Polish. This use of What has already been accounted for. It is time now to deal with the use of What that corresponds to Jaki/a/e in Polish.

In the first place we must decide whether the What which corresponds to Jaki ... in Polish is derived from the SS containing the noun Thing/Rzecz, or whether it is derived from the SS containing the noun Person/Osoba. As can be seen in 128/ and 129/ What occurs before nouns denoting both persons and things.

(89) What book would you like to read?
(90) What girl would you like to meet?

Moreover, (89) and (90) are asking about some features of the nouns which follow What; in this case "book" and "girl", rather than about the identity. If the latter

were the case we would have (91) and (92).

(91) What would you like to read?
(92) Who would you like to meet?

Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that the What which corresponds to Jaki ... in Polish is derived from the SS which contains a dummy instead of Person or Thing. The same SS will be proposed for, Jaki ... in Polish.[22] This What will be marked as $What_2$.

It must be emphasized that Whose and Which and their counterparts in Polish, i.e., Czyj ... and Który ... will be derived from SS's which contain dummies.[23]

Having presented the basic facts concerning the semantics of QW's in English and Polish it is time now to present SS's from which Who, $What_1$, Whose, Which, and $What_2$, and their respective Polish counterparts; Kto, Co, Czyj ..., Który ..., and Jaki . . are derived. (93-97) represent the respective SS's.

(93)



Who/Kto

(94)



$What_1$/Co

(95)



Whose/Czyj

(96)



Which/Który

(97)



SS's for the mentioned QW's are identical for English and Polish therefore these QW's are found to be equivalent at the level of semantic representation.

Let us now see how these SS's are represented in SQ's in English and Polish. The presentation will be limited to the most frequent occurrences of Who, What$_1$, Which, and What$_2$ in English and their respective counterparts in Polish, i.e., Kto, Co, Czyj..., Który..., Jaki...,. Of Particular interest here are occurrences of QW's with prepositions in English. The basic difference between English and Polish in this respect is the position of prepositions in SQ's. As is well known, in Colloquial English the preposition is usually stranded from the QW and occupies the final position in SQ's. In Polish, on the other hand, the preposition occurs right after the QW and is never stranded from it. Thus, the combination "QW + Preposition" is more flexible in English than in Polish. According to Leech and Svartvik (1975: 114) the final position of prepositions in English SQ's signals an informal style. The flexibility of the combination "QW + Preposition" in English is well illustrated in (98-101).

(98) What did he write it with?..... informal
(99) With what did he write? ..... formal
(100) What with? ..... informal
(101) With what? ..... formal

However, prepositions consisting of more than one word (we shall call them "complex" after Leech and Svartvik 1975: 275) are rarely placed at the end of a SQ in English. Notice the oddity of (103) as opposed to "usualness" of (102).

(102) In connection with what were two men intervied at the police station?

(103) What were two men intervied at the police station in connection with?

Let us now concentrate on the presentation of surface representations of the SS's proposed above. For brevity the presentation will be tabulated.

(104)	Surface Representation
ENGLISH	POLISH
1. Who/whom	3. Kto, Kogo, Komu, Kim
1. about	1. o kim
2. as	2. jako kto
3. at	3. na kogo, kogo, do kogo
4. for	4. dla kogo, na kogo, kogo
2. Who- 5. from	4. 5. od kogo
6. in	6. w kogo, komu
7. of	7. o kim
8. on	8. na kim
9. to	9. do kogo, komu
10. with	10. z kim

(105)	Surface Representation
ENGLISH	POLISH
1. $What_1$	3. Co, Czego, Czym
1. about	1. o czym
2. as	2. jako co
3. at	3. na co, do,czego
4. for	4. na co
2. $What_1$ 5. from	4. 5. od czego, z czego
6. in	6. w co
7. of	7. o czym, o co, na co, z czego
8. on	8. na czym, od czego
9. to	9. do czego, czemu
10. with	10. w co, czym

(106)	Surface Representation	
	ENGLISH	POLISH
1. Whose		3. Czyj ..., Czyjego ..., Czyim
	1. about	1. o czyim ...
	2. as	2. jako czyj...
	3. at	3. na czyj..., z czyjego...
	4. for	4. na czyjego, dla czyjego...
2. Whose	5. from	4. 5. od czyjego..., z czyjego...
	6. in	6. w czyjego...
	7. of	7. czyjego..., o czyim...
	8. on	8. na czyjego...
	9. to	9. czyjego..., na czyjego..., do czyjego...
	10. with	10. z czyim

(107)	Surface Representation	
	ENGLISH	POLISH
1. Which		3. Który..., Którego...,Którym...,
	1. about	1. o którym...
	2. as	2. jako który...
	3. at	3. na którego...,
		z którego...
	4. for	4. dla którego...,
		na którego...,
		po którego...
2. Which	5. from	4. 5. od którego...,
		z którego...
	6. in	6. w którego...
	7. of	7. o którym...
	8. on	8. na którym...
	9. to	9. do którego...
	10. with	10. z którego...,
		którym

(108) Surface Representation	
ENGLISH	POLISH
1. $What_2$	3. Jaki..., Jakiego..., Jakim...
1. about	1. o jakim...
2. as	2. jako jaki...
3. at	3. na jakiego..., w jakim...
4. for	4. dla jakiego..., na jakiego...
2. $What_2$ 5. from	4. 5. od jakiego...
6. in	6. do jakiego..., w jakiego...
7. of	7. o jakim...
8. on	8. na jakiego...
9. to	9. do jakiego...
10. with	10. z jakim..., jakim...

Throughout (104-108) 1. in English corresponds to 3. in Polish, 2. in English corresponds to 4. in Polish, etc.

It can be added that we have ignored such things as case, number, and gender in the case of Polish counterparts: in fact, we have selected "masculine" whenever gender had to be selected.

In the above discussion we have tried to defend a hypothesis that QW's are derived from indefinite NP's. In order to support the indefiniteness hypothesis we have provided arguments based upon the speaker-based presuppositions that are usually associated with

SQ's. Next, we have proposed that QW's be derived from semantic structures SS's which contain two elements; a pro-form N and a feature matrix FM. SS's for the QW's under investigation have been found to be identical in English and Polish. It has been claimed that semantic differences among QW's can be related to differences in their respective SS's. Finally, SS's for WHO, $WHAT_1$, WHOSE, WHICH, AND $WHAT_2$, in English,and KTO, CO, CZYJ..., KTORY..., AND JAKI..., in Polish, together with the most frequently occurring surface representations of these SS's have been presented.

6. QUESTION WORDS OF PLACE AND TIME

In this section we shall deal with two types of QW's in English and Polish: Question Words of Place and Question Words of Time, hereafter QWPL and QWT, respectively.

It must be stated at the outset that both QWPL and QWT are slightly different from QWP and QWTH. We shall now dwell a bit on these differences.

As has been pointed out earlier in this chapter QWP and QWTH contain the following features in their respective FM's: (+ Inter), (- Def), (+ Indent), ($\pm$ Select), and ($\pm$ Poss). The first three features are present in FM's for all QW's in English and Polish. It will be noted that FM's for QWPL and QWT are characterized by possessing the features (- Select) and (- Poss).

The feature (+ Indent) that we postulated for all QW accounts for the unique function QW's perform in SQ's in both languages; QW's are used wherever the speaker wants to identify a person, a thing, a state of affairs, etc. This treatment of QW's provides a convenient framework for a semantic description of all QW's in English and Polish.

Accordingly, we can say that the identifying function of QW's is captured if the feature (+ Ident) is postulated for SS's underlying all QW's. (109) below represents what might be called a semantic reading of the feature (+ Ident):

(109) 1. WHO - identify the person such that (PP)
2. $WHAT_1$ - identify the thing such that (PP)

3. $WHAT_2$ - identify the quality of a person or thing such that (PP)
4. WHICH - identify the person or thing such that (PP)
5. WHOSE - identify the person or thing such that (PP)
6. WHERE - identify the place such that (PP)
7. WHEN - identify the time such that (PP)
8. WHY - identify the reason such that (PP)
9. HOW - identify the manner such that (PP)

where "PP" stands for the pragmatic presupposition.

Despite the fact that all QW's are characterized by possessing the feature (+ Ident) in their SS's it must be borne in mind that only QWP and QWTH, i.e., WHO, $WHAT_1$, WHICH, and to some extent WHOSE AND $WHAT_2$, can be used in SQ's to ask about the referents of the nouns "person" or "thing" occuring in the underlying structure of the SQ's.[24]. However, QWT, QWPL, QWM etc., (i.e., WHEN, WHERE, HOW, etc.,) do not carry the referential force of the above mentioned QWP's and QWTH's. The reason why this is so is quite obvious. SQ's are asking about some definite NP and, in fact, it is immaterial whether this NP corresponds to "place" or "person" or "thing" in the underlying structure. The answer to such a question contains a specification of some definite NP which, at the same time, is a referent of the NP in the underlying structure. On the other hand, SQ's which contain, e.g., WHERE are asking about NP's that can be drawn from an indefinite set. The same can be said about WHEN, WHY, and HOW. For this reason SQ's which contain WHERE, WHEN, etc., are not, typically, used to ask about the referents of the NP "place", "time", etc. To support this claim we can quote Strawson (1971: 88) who states the following in connection with "identifying-reference expressions":

> "These kinds (of expressions) include proper names, definite and possessive and demonstrative descriptions, demonstrative and personal pronouns."

It is worth pointing out that "WHICH + NP" (or "WHAT + NP") when used in a SQ are asking about "place" only when it is otherwise indicated that what the speaker is ignorant about is "some place". Notice that (110) is not asking about "place" but (112) can be asking about "place".

(110) Which house did you buy?

(111) Który dom kupiłeś?
(112) Which house did they run to?
(113) Do którego domu pobiegli?

We shall not be concerned with the use of "WHICH" and "WHAT" followed by a NP in the function of QWPL. It suffices to say that the primary function of these expressions is to identify persons, things, etc. When they are used in SQ's to ask about "place" this is usually indicated by the presence of "Prepositions of Place" in the surface forms of SQ's, e.g., AT, BY, TO, etc. A detailed treatment of "Prepositions of Place" can be found in Leech and Svartvik (1975) and Quirk et al (1972).

As is well known, WHERE in English can be used in SQ's to ask about "place" , where "place" denotes both "position" and "direction".

An important difference between English and Polish with regard to QWPL is that in Polish there exist separate one-word QW's that are used to ask about "direction". Compare the examples below:

(114) Skąd przyszła paczka?
(115) Where did the parcel come from?
(116) Dokąd pójdziesz?
(117) Where will you go /to/?
(118) Którędy pojedziemy do hotelu?(119) Which way shall we drive to the hotel?

From the above examples it is clear that when asking about "direction-form" Polish uses "SKĄD" whereas English uses "WHERE from". "DOKĄD" is used in Polish to ask about "direction-towards". This, in turn, can be rendered in English by means of "WHERE...to". "KTOREDY" is rendered in English as "WHICH WAY".

Let us now present the SS for QWPL in English and Polish; (120) and (121) for English and Polish, respectively.

(120)



(121)



The surface representations of (120) and (121) are presented in (122).

(122)	SURFACE REPRESENTATION	
	English	Polish
	1. Where	5. Gdzie
	2. Where ... to	6. Dokąd
	3. Where ... from	7. Skąd
	4. Which way	8. Którędy

It can be added that SQ's in English and Polish which contain QWPL presuppose that the event expressed in the propositional part of the question occurs at some place; hence the presence of "Place/Miejsce" under the domination of N in SS's underlying QWPL's.

We shall now consider two cases where the occurrence of WHERE/GDZIE in the surface does not indicate that "Place" is presupposed.

Consider (123) and (124) below:

(123) Where is your sense of humour?
(124) Gdzie twoje poczucie humoru?

In the first place, (123) and (124) are not SQ's in the sense adapted in this study. Rather, they express the speaker's doubt about the hearer's sense of humour, roughly, (125) and (126).

(125) You have no sense of humour.
(126) Nie masz poczucia humoru.

Another case where WHERE/GDZIE do not presuppose "place" is presented in (127) and (128).

(127) Where is your bicycle, Jimmy?
(128) Gdzie jest twój rower, Jimmy?

If (127) or (128) is uttered by a parent who has just learned that his son Jimmy had traded his bicycle for a collection of stamps then (127) and (128) are not asking about

'place'. They mean something close to (129) and (130).

(129) What have you done with your bicycle, Jimmy?
(130) Co zrobiłeś z rowerem, Jimmy?

We shall now deal with Question Words of Time (QWT) in English and Polish. QWT's occur in SQ's in which the speaker presupposes that a certain state of affairs has some time reference but he, the speaker, is ignorant about that time reference.

One can distinguish three basic types of QWT's: QWT's asking about duration, QWT's asking about frequency, and QWT's asking about some point of time or a boundary of time (cf., Quirk et al 1972). It is worth pointing out that it is possible in English to use WHAT + time expression, WHICH + time expression, and HOW many + time expression. All these expressions have equivalent forms in Polish. However, the surface representations in Polish do not display the regularity of the English forms. In Polish, when asking about the exact hour, day, or month, etc., it is necessary to place the appropriate time preposition at the beginning of the question and/or to use the appropriate case. Compare the examples below:

(131) What time is it?
(132) Która godzina?
(133) What time does the train leave?
(134) O której godzinie odjeżdża pociąg?
(135) Which day in February is the longest?
(136) Który dzień w lutym jest najdłuższy?
(137) Which day did you receive the letter?
(138) Którego dnia otrzymałeś list?
(139) How many weeks did you wait for the news?
(140) Ile tygodni czekałeś na tę wiadomość?

We shall not go into more detail concerning the substitution of QWT by other QW's. It suffices to say that WHICH and WHAT in English and KTÓRY/a/e and JAKI/a/e in Polish can be used in place of WHEN and KIEDY whenever a more detailed specification of time reference is needed.

Let us now present SS's for QWT's in English and Polish: (141) and (142).

(141)



(142)



(143) represents the most typical surface representations of (141) and (142) in English and Polish.

(143) Surface Representation	
English	Polish
1. When	8. Kiedy
2. How long (ago)	9. Jak dawno (temu)
3. (For) how long	10. (Przez) jak długo
4. (For) how many + time exp.	11. (Przez) ile + time exp.
5. Since when	12. Odkąd, od kiedy, Od jak dawna
6. How often	13. Jak często
7. How many times	14. Ile razy

WHEN/KIEDY can be ambiguous. (144) and (145) can be asking about "point of time" but they can be used to convey what (146) and (147) convey.

(144) When can I receive your application?
(145) Kiedy mogę otrzymać twoje podanie?
(146) Under what condition can I receive your application?
(147) Pod jakim warunkiem mogę otrzymać twoje podanie?

It must be pointed out that some QWT in English seem to be biased towards some tenses. Thus, "How long ago" is restricted to contexts with Past Simple Tnese. "Since when" is used more often with Perfect Tenses. Without going into detail one can say that this type of relationship holding between QWT and Tense in English is also present in Polish.

"Jak dawno temu" and "Od jak dawna" ("How long ago" and "Since when") are restricted to the Past Tense. On the other hand, "Odkąd" and "Od kiedy" (both of them being equivalent to "Since when") in certain contexts are not restricted with respect to tenses.

Summing up, we can say that QWPL and QWT in English and Polish have been found to be equivalent at the level of underlying representation, but different at the level of surface realization.

7. QUESTION WORDS OF REASON AND MANNER

In order to complete our discussion on QW's in English and Polish we shall now deal with two types of QW's in English and Polish: Question Words of Reason (QWR) and Question Words of Manner (QWM).

It is a well-known fact that SQ's containing WHY and HOW have been derived in transformational approaches from "for some reason" and "in some way" (cf., among others, Katz and Postal 1964, Kuroda 1968, Lewandowska 1971). It was assumed that these questions were used in communication to ask about the reason why something happened or about the manner in which something happened.

It will be shown in what follows that the underlying structures of these QW's and, consequently, the semantics of WHY and HOW questions is more complex than is implied in most transformational treatments of SQ's.

In the first place, it will be demonstrated that WHY and HOW, as well as their counterparts in Polish, i.e., DLACZEGO and JAK, are not the only surface exponents of QWR's and QWM's. Secondly, the complex semantic nature of questions containing QWR's and QWM's will be discussed.

We shall follow the procedure adapted for the analysis of QW's in previous sections of this chapter. Accordingly, we shall proceed by analyzing NP Reason after which the name of the whole class has been coined.

It must be emphasized at the outset that NP Reason is a complex semantic entity. It will be, perhaps, worth mentioning at this point that the problems posed by QWR in SQ's make up but a fraction of a more general phenomenon of "causation", especially when answers to SQ's containing QWR's are considered. How complex the problem might be can be inferred from numerous papers, for instance, Glasenfeld (1974), Williams (1975), and especially Shibatani (1976).

For reasons of scope our discussion will be limited to considerations of the semantics of Reason. In other words, we shall try to see what means both languages have at the speaker's disposal to enable him to ask about Reason. We shall also try to see what the speaker is actually asking about when he is uttering a SQ containing a QWR.

Bolinger (1957: 124) mentions that Reason may mean either "motive" or "cause"; the former is realized overtly as WHY and the latter as HOW COME. But things do not look that simple. Gordon and Lakoff (1971: 70), for example, point out that Why Q's which ask for a reason, may, in fact, be asking for eitherinformation or for justification, e.g.:

(148) Why are you painting your house purple?
(149) Dlaczego malujesz swój dom na purpurowo?

According to Zwicky and Zwicky (1971) NP Reason may refer to an external explanation, i.e., a cause or to an internal explanation, i.e., a purpose. The split of the semantic structure of Reason into Cause and Purpose is relevant to semantic considerations and we shall dwell upon this.

The Cause/Purpose division of Reason is manifested in questions as HOW COME and WHAT ... for, respectively. These two aspects of Reason can be neutralized in questions occuring in discourse to WHY.

(150) below may be said to represent the semantic structure of Reason:

(150)

(150) above represents the semantic structure of Reason, which is a part of the semantic input for all WHY Questions in English and Polish. For the sake of simplicity Reason will be the NP representing (150) above in the SS for QWR.

Let us now examine some SQ's in English and Polish with QWR's.

(151) Why has she read this book?
(152) Dlaczego ona przeczytała tę książkę?
(153) How come she has read this book?
(154) Jak to się stało/jak do tego doszło/, że ona przeczytała tę książkę?
(155) What has she read this book for?
(156) Po co/w jakim celu/ona przeczytała tę książkę?
(157) How do you know she has read this book?
(158) Skąd wiesz, że ona przeczytała tę książkę?

Below are the presuppositions that the speaker has upon uttering (151-158):

(159) She has read this book for some reason.
(160) Ona przeczytała tę książkę z jakiegoś powodu.
(161) She has read this book in some circumstances.
(162) Ona przeczytała tę książkę w jakichś okolicznościach.
(163) She has read this book for some purpose.
(164) Ona przeczytała tę książkę w jakimś celu.
(165) You know the circumstances in which she has read this book.
(166) Ty znasz okoliczności, w których ona przeczytała tę książkę.

(159-166) clearly show differences among questions in (151-158). These differences are related to different presuppositions.

It is worth adding that "for some reason", "in some circumstances", and "for some purpose" and their counterparts in Polish also appear in a more formal language instead of QWR's.

(167) For what reason has she read this book?
(168) Z jakiego powodu ona przeczytała tę książkę?
(169) In what circumstances has she read this book?
(170) W jakich okolicznościach ona przeczytała tą książkę?
(171) For what purpose has she read this book?
(172) W jakim celu ona przeczytała tę książkę?
(173) In what circumstances did you come to know that she had read this book?
(174) W jakich okolicznościach dowiedziałeś się, że ona przeczytała tę książkę?

Let us now see how (151-158) can be answered. (175-182) represent possible answers to (151-158).

(175) To pass the exam.

(176) Żeby zdać egzamin.
(177) She read a chapter whenever she visited me.
(178) Czytała rozdział kiedykolwiek mnie odwiedziła.
(179) To learn something about sexual life of savages.
(180) Żeby dowiedzieć się czegoś o życiu seksualnym dzikich.
(181) John told me about it.
(182) Jan mi o tym powiedział.

It is easy to see from the above that questions containing WHY/DLACZEGO can elicit the same answer as questions containing WHAT ... for and, HOW COME. But this is not always true the other way around.

Although it is not our intention to discuss here syntactic properties of SQ's it can be mentioned in passing that HOW COME and WHAT ... for behave differently in SQ's. HOW COME does not allow for the inverted word order whereas WHAT ... for does. Furthermore, HOW COME can never be stranded and WHAT ... for often is.

In polish PO CO/W JAKIM CELU function as preposed adverbials whereas Jak to się stało/ Jak do tego doszło function as preposed adverbial clauses and require "że clause" after them.

Let us now return to HOW in the function of a QWR (cf., Bolinger 1957, Huddleston 1971). Huddleston (1971: 27) has pointed out that HOW in (183) does not question the manner of knowing in the static sense of "know" but rather it questions the way in which the knowing came about.

(183) How do you know he's still there?
(184) Skąd wiesz, że on tam jeszcze jest?

We cannot but agree with Huddleston. The same meaning of HOW is encountered in (157) and (158). This meaning of HOW and its equivalent in Polish, i.e., SKĄD has been explained by relating these QW's to the presuppositions given in (165) and (166).

Summing up, we shall present the SS for QWR in English and Polish (185 and 186 respectively) and their surface realizations in both languages, i.e., (187).

(185)



(186)



(187)

Surface Representation	
English	Polish
1. Why	6. Dlaczego/czemu/za co
2. How come	7. Jak to się stało Jak do tego doszło
3. How	8. Skąd
4. Why	9. Dlaczego/czemu
5. What ... for	10. Po co/w jakim celu

Having discussed QWR's we can now pass to Question Words of Manner (QWM). It is a matter of common knowledge that SQ's in English with HOW and SQ's in Polish with JAK function as QWM's. This use of HOW and JAK is demonstrated in (188) and (189).

(188) How did they put the fire out?
(189) Jak oni zgazili ten pożar?

In most transformational treatments, HOW in (188) would be derived from the underlying "in some way" (cf., Katz and Postal 1964, Koutsoudas 1968, Stockwell et al 1973). The same analysis could be postulated for JAK. However, SQ's containing HOW can be ambiguous in English. Consider, e.g., (190).

(190) How did you find Peter?

It is interesting to observe that (190) can be asking about the way in which Peter was found. We shall call this a manner-interpretation or simply (+ Manner). However, (190) can also be asking about the condition of Peter's health - we shall call this (- Manner). Under the second interpretation (190) is close in meaning to (191).

(191) How was Peter (feeling)?

The ambiguity of (190) is seen clearly if the Polish translation is taken into consideration. (192) and (193) are the respective (+ Manner) and (- Manner) renderings of (190) in Polish.

(192) Jak znalazłeś (odnalazłeś) Piotra?
(193) Jak czuł się Piotr? (W jakim stanie znalazłeś Piotra?)

The ambiguity of (190) is due to the presence of the verb "find"; once it can be a static verb with the meaning "to have an opinion on something" and another time it can be a verb of action.

Huddleston (1971: 27) points out that in English, HOW questions the Manner constituent but this constituent is much less defined than those of TIME, PLACE, and REASON. We agree with Huddleston. The same can be said about the Manner constituent in Polish. Notice that even a simple question as is the one in (194) can elicit a wide range of answers:

(194) How did he open the safe?
(195) Jak on otworzył sejf?
(196) With great skill. = Skilfully
(197) Z wielką wprawą = Wprawnie
(198) By forcing the lock.
(199) Wyłamując zamek.
(200) With a special key.
(201) Specjalnym kluczem.

(196-201) answers to (194-195) clearly show that HOW can be asking about Manner (196-97), Means (198-199), and Instrument (200-201). Thus (194-195) can be ambiguous three ways.

It can be added that in both languages there exists a direct, non-ambiguous way of asking about Instrument. In English this can be done by means of WHAT ... with and in Polish by means of CZYM. This is shown in (202) and (203).

(202) What did he open the safe with?
(203) Czym on otworzył sejf?

Also notice that (204-205) can be ambiguous between the Manner and Non-manner interpretations: (206-209) as answers to (204-205) indicate the two meanings.

(204) How did he die?
(205) Jak on umarł?
(206) Peacefully.
(207) He was poisoned.

(208) Spokojnie. (W spokoju)
(209) Otruto go.

As was said above SQ's containing HOW in English and JAK in Polish can be asking about Manner, Means, and Instrument. This is represented in (210).

(210)

In our analysis, Manner/Sposób will represent all three possibilities in the SS for QWM's in English and Polish. (211) and (212) represent the respective SS's in English and Polish and (213) represents the surface representations of (211) and (212).

(211)



(212)



(213)

Surface Representation	
English	Polish
1. How	4. Jak
2. What ... with	5. Czym
3. What ... of	6. Od czego

8. QUESTION WORDS OF DEGREE AND QUANTITY

In this section we shall consider the last two types of QW's in English and Polish: Question Words of Degree and Question Words of Quantity, hereafter (QWD) and (QWQ).

It has been noticed by many linguists that HOW in English SQ's can be used attributively (cf., Bolinger 1957, Huddleston 1971, Quirk et al 1972, Leech and Svart-

1975).

(213-216) below show that HOW can be used before adjectives and adverbs. The same can be said about JAKI/a/e and JAK in Polish.

(213) How long is the street?
(214) Jak/Jaka długa jest ulica?
(215) How fast can you type?
(216) Jak szybko piszesz na maszynie?

An interesting observation to be made about (213-216) is that they do not presuppose (217-220).

(217) The street is long.
(218) Ta ulica jest długa.
(219) You can type fast.
(220) Ty szybko piszesz na maszynie.

Rather, they presuppose that the street has some length in the case of (213-214) and that someone types with some speed in the case of (215-216). What is being asked in these questions is the degree to which the street is long.

A different case is presented in (221-222). Here, the English idiomatic expression "How old ..." is invariably rendered in Polish as "Ile ... lat".

(221) How old are you?
(222) Ile masz lat?

It is trivial to observe that communicatively (221) and (222) are equivalent. However, there exists a slight difference between them in that (222), unlike (221), is asking about the number of years. It seems that the best way of dealing with (221-222) is to treat them as belonging to the category of Time Questions rather than Degree Questions.

It is well known that HOW in English can be used to ask about "Quantity". In this function HOW is followed by "many" and "much" depending on the type of noun that follows. Accordingly, we shall treat HOW MANY and HOW MUCH as independent QW's. The quantitative function of HOW MANY/HOW MUCH is expressed in Polish by means of ILE and ILU depending on the gender of the NP that follows. We shall call them Question Words of Quantity (QWQ). Compare the examples below:

(223) How many boys did you see?
(224) Ilu chłopców widziałeś?
(225) How many girls did you see?
(226) Ile dziewcząt widziałeś?
(227) How much money have you got?
(228) Ile masz pieniędzy?

In view of the above it is reasonable to assume that HOW MANY/HOW MUCH in English and ILE/ILU in Polish are related to an underlying semantic source Quantity. Syntactically QMQ's are different from QMD's: the former occur before nouns and the latter occur before adjectives and adverbs.

It must be pointed out that QMQ's are, indirectly, asking about "persons" and "things" since to ask about the number of boys and the amount of money is, in some way, to ask about "boys" and "money".

The discussion on QMD's and QMQ's can be summed up with the presentation of the SS's underlying these QW's in English and Polish: (229-231) for QMD's and (232-235) for QMD's.

(229)



(230)



(231)

Surface Representation	
English	Polish
1. How	2. Jaki, Jaka, Jakie

(232)



(233)



(234)	Surface Representation
English	Polish
1. How many	3. Ile, Ilu
2. How much	

SUMMARY

In this chapter we have dealt with SQ's in English and Polish. In fact, relatively little attention has been devoted to the analysis of full forms of SQ's. This approach has resulted from the belief that given the PS and PP of any SQ what remains to be explained is the semantics of the QW (or QW's) which occurs in the given SQ.

We have sketched problems involved in the classification of QW's in English and Polish. We have shown that the classification of QW's based upon their surface occurences in SQ's is far from being satisfactory and of little value in establishing the equivalent forms in both languages. Accordingly, a semantic analysis has been proposed for QW's in English and Polish, which has resulted in establishing eight types of QW's in both languages. Each type has been shown to be related to a Semantic Structure (SS) which contains a pro-form noun (N) and a Feature Matrix (FM). The SS for the given type of a QW provides the semantic characterization of surface occurences of QW's derived from that SS. QW's occuring in the surface forms of SQ's belong to the same type if they are related to the same SS irrespective of their phonological shape. Each SS in English has a corresponding SS in Polish. QW's related to the same SS are equivalent.

NP's occuring in SS's constitute a part of the propositional structure of SQ's. The semantic interpretation of SQ's in English and Polish can be performed successfully if in addition to NP's occuring in SS's for QW's the propositional structure and the pragmatic presupposition are accounted for. The full description of a SQ including its semantic and communicative characterization can be performed along the lines proposed in Chapter 2. SQ's in English and Polish are equivalent if and only if they are related to the same propositional and presuppositional structures.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

[1] Compare the following questions:

1. Is Pat on the mat with a cat?
2. Where is Pat with a cat?
3. Who is on the mat with a cat?
4. Who is Pat on the mat with?

We shall not go into any detail concerning the surface structures of (1 - 4) or their respective underlying structures.

[2] Most authors dealing with sentence types would mention "zdanie pytające" but these authors rarely go into any detail. For this reason their names do not appear here. One must be aware though that there exist many works on questions written by Polish philosophers and logicians: Ajdukiewicz (1960), Ingarden (1925), Ackowski (1964), Kubiński (1970), Marciszewski (1974), to mention just a few.

[3] Cf., Krzeszowski (1974: 200).

[4] The initial position of question words in SQ's is not characteristic of all languages. Cf., Keenan (1972: 442).

[5] In Polish this is, perhaps, more often expressed by "Gdzie pojechała?" uttered with a heavy stress and high pitch on "gdzie".

[6] A third interpretation for (1) and (2) is that they function as genuine SQ's.

[7] Also cf., Grinder (1971).

[8] Incidentally, we have demonstrated that Sluicing can be postulated for Polish.

[9] Cf., Bolinger's (1957) "pyramided questions".

[10] The English terms are given after Gołąb et al (1968).

[11] Curme (1960) classifies interrogative words into three classes: interrogative adjectives, interrogative adverbs, and interrogative pronouns.

[12] Jodłowski fails to mention "Dlaczego".

[13] Notice that (32) can be rendered as " Którą drogą pojedziemy?" as well.

[14] Cf., Jodłowski (1976: 20-22) for an interesting treatment of the parasyntactic elements of utterances. Cf., also Grodziński (1964) on "syncategorematic words", and Krasnowolski (1897: 216) on "enclitic -że/-ż" in Polish.